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ARTICLE 
TIERS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.† 
When compared with other constitutional doctrines, Establishment Clause 
doctrine is confused and anomalous, both substantively and with regard to standing. 
The Supreme Court ought to craft reforms in light of a wide-angle appraisal of 
pertinent comparisons, analogies, and interconnections. Substantively, the Justices 
should adopt the tiers-of-scrutiny approach that the Court employs under the Free 
Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses. Within a tiered-scrutiny 
regime, the Court should strictly scrutinize any statute that classifies or requires 
classifications based on religion. It should prescribe intermediate scrutiny for statutes 
that expend tax revenues to provide material benefits to churches or religiously 
affiliated organizations on a nondiscriminatory, nonpreferential basis. And it should 
clarify its approach to determining which symbolic supports for religion rise to the 
level of Establishment Clause violations. Correspondingly, the Court should realign 
standing doctrine to equate the injuries needed for standing more closely with those 
against which the Establishment Clause furnishes substantive protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Establishment Clause doctrine is notoriously confused and disarrayed—
“a farrago of unstable rules, tests, standards, principles, and exceptions” that 
“leaves constitutional law scholars reminiscing wistfully about the elegance 
and simplicity of the Uniform Commercial Code or the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.”1 Establishment Clause doctrine is also anomalous as compared 
with the rule structure that prevails in analogous areas of constitutional law. 
In this Article, I argue that consideration of two central anomalies, and of 
some of the confusions that surround them, will illumine a path to attractive, 
rationalizing, clarifying reforms. 
First, unlike many other doctrines that protect individual rights, the 
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause cases do not employ an analytically 
sequenced, tiered framework for judicial review of the kind that the Court 
uses to enforce the Free Speech, Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Due 
 
1 PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE 223 (2011). 
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Process Clauses, for example.2 In tiered-scrutiny regimes, a court asks first 
whether a challenger has alleged a violation of a right or interest to which a 
particular constitutional provision plausibly extends protection.3 If not, the 
court dismisses any constitutional challenges without further analysis. If a 
case plausibly comes within a provision’s protective ambit, however, the court 
applies a more or less elevated level of scrutiny, depending on the violation 
alleged.4 In cases involving direct infringements of fundamental rights or 
interests, either strict or intermediate scrutiny—as distinguished from 
rational basis review—normally applies. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has 
blurred the lines between its traditional tiers of review in some recent cases, 
especially involving gay rights.5 Nevertheless, analytically sequenced, tiered 
review defines the norm in important swathes of constitutional law. 
Establishment Clause cases disdain this approach. In the words of leading 
commentators, “long-standing Establishment Clause methodology” dictates 
that “[o]nce a practice . . . is judicially determined to be an establishment of 
religion . . . [c]ompeting government interests play no part.”6 Instead, the 
Supreme Court has often held that statutes that were adopted either 
exclusively or predominantly for the forbidden purpose of promoting 
religion, or that have the principal or primary effect of doing so, are per se 
 
2 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268-69 (2007) 
(documenting the Supreme Court’s reliance on a strict scrutiny test to identify constitutional 
violations under these and other provisions). 
3 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration 
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769-74 (2004) (distinguishing between the 
“coverage” of the First Amendment and the protection that it ultimately affords or does not afford 
following the application of a First Amendment test). 
4 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 87-89 (2001) 
(discussing suspect- and non-suspect-content tests); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate 
Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 786-87 
(explaining the role of tiers of review in Free Speech Clause doctrine); Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 494-503 (2004) (examining the development of 
suspect-classification analysis under the Equal Protection Clause). 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that the Defense of 
Marriage Act violated the Fifth Amendment without specifying the level of scrutiny applied); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (invalidating an anti-sodomy ordinance under the Due 
Process Clause without invoking strict scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding 
that a Colorado constitutional amendment that barred anti-discrimination protections for gays and 
lesbians failed to meet even the rational basis test). 
6 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1276-77 (2017); 
see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012) 
(“The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly 
important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, 
teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church 
alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for 
us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”). 
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invalid.7 Yet the Court has not applied that test—which is often associated 
with Lemon v. Kurtzman8—consistently. Some leading cases have reached 
results that would be hard if not impossible to justify if the Court applied 
Lemon’s stated prohibitions categorically.9 
In cases involving the permissibility of statutes that lift burdens on 
religious institutions and religiously motivated individuals, the Court has said 
that no Establishment Clause violation occurs if the government responds to 
severe, governmentally imposed hardships and “take[s] adequate account of 
the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”10 
This formulation may hint that the government must closely tailor any 
religiously-based preferences to the promotion of governmental interests of 
some kind, but does not say so expressly. Moreover, tailoring analysis is 
wholly absent in most Establishment Clause cases, including both those that 
uphold and those that reject constitutional challenges. As if befuddled about 
how to rationalize the existing pattern of results, the Court has sometimes 
rejected Establishment Clause challenges without clear reliance on any 
doctrinal formula whatsoever.11 
The introduction of a regime of analytically sequenced, tiered scrutiny 
would help impose both clarity and rational order on the currently chaotic 
Establishment Clause landscape. No linguistic or historical logic dictates that 
all constitutional doctrines should have the same structure. But the attractions 
of analytically sequenced, tiered scrutiny are familiar and intuitive.12 
Consider a hypothetical case in which a state legislature long ago adopted the 
 
7 See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005) (affirming that 
“a determination of the counties’ [forbidden] purpose is a sound basis” for finding an Establishment 
Clause violation); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (“[A]ppellants have identified no 
clear secular purpose for the Louisiana Act.”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (striking 
down the statute at issue since it “had no secular purpose” (emphasis in original)). 
8 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). See infra note 104 and accompanying text (quoting the Lemon test). 
9 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014) (upholding a town’s practice 
of beginning official meetings with a public prayer); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) 
(ruling that a town’s display of a crèche did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
10 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
11 See, e.g., Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (“Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not 
necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the 
specific practice is permitted. Any test the Court adopts must acknowledge a practice that was 
accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change.”); 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“Whatever may be the fate of the 
Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in 
dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead, 
our analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history.”). 
12 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1292-93 (discussing the attractions of strict judicial scrutiny); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 295-96 (1992) (describing the role of tiers of review in efforts to promote 
judicial restraint). 
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state statute prohibiting murder for the sole purpose—in the psychological 
sense of that term—of enforcing one of God’s commandments. To hold such 
a statute per se invalid because of the legislature’s forbidden intent would 
seem draconian and untenable. Many of us would have a similar reaction if 
local authorities required the vaccination of school children solely for the 
forbidden purpose of discouraging Christian Scientists from moving into a 
community, but it later became apparent that requiring vaccinations served 
vital public health interests. For those who share these intuitions, a typical 
response, informed by other constitutional doctrines, would postulate that the 
hypothesized statutes should incur strict judicial scrutiny, but that they should 
survive if sufficiently narrowly tailored to compelling governmental interests.13 
A real, topical example further illustrates the anomalous character of the 
Supreme Court’s failure to apply analytically sequenced, tiered judicial 
scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. Statutes that exempt religious 
institutions or religiously motivated individuals from otherwise generally 
applicable laws require religiously-based classifications in order to sort those 
who qualify for exemptions from those who do not. If challenged under the 
Equal Protection Clause, classifications based on religion, the Court has 
sometimes asserted, would be assimilated to those based on race.14 And race-
based classifications trigger strict judicial scrutiny.15 The Court has also 
prescribed strict scrutiny for religiously-based classifications under the Free 
Exercise Clause, at least when they are used to exclude some from benefits 
 
13 This conclusion represents an application of the broader thesis that statutes should never be 
deemed per se impermissible based solely on legislative intentions in the psychological sense. See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 558 (2016). 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (“[T]he decision whether 
to prosecute may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.’” (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 
911 (1995) (“At the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command 
that the Government must treat citizens ‘as individuals, not “as simply components of a racial, 
religious, sexual or national class.”’” (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990))); 
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992) (identifying classifications drawn along 
“lines like race or religion” as “suspect”); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) 
(characterizing “distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage” as “suspect”). 
15 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (‘“[B]ecause racial 
characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment,”’ ‘“[r]ace may not be 
considered [by a university] unless the admissions process can withstand strict scrutiny.”’ (citations 
omitted)); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“We have held that ‘all racial 
classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 
scrutiny.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))). In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, after having 
determined that the exclusion of a church from eligibility for participation in a state funding 
program solely because of its status as a church failed strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, 
the Court determined that it “need not reach the Church’s claim that the policy also violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.” 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 n.5 (2017). 
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available to others based on their religious status.16 If classifications based on 
religion are suspect under the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses, 
why, one wonders, should they escape strict judicial scrutiny in Establishment 
Clause cases?17 A possible response would be that the Court regards many 
statutory accommodations for religious practitioners as benign, even 
desirable, and believes that they should be upheld if they do not impose 
excessive burdens on third parties. But in cases involving other classifications 
drawn along “suspect” lines, including those involving race-based affirmative 
action in higher education, that conclusion would need to emerge from a strict 
scrutiny framework.18 A disposition to favor otherwise suspect line-drawing 
in a particular context would not furnish a justification for forgoing searching 
analysis. 
Adoption of an analytically sequenced, tiered-scrutiny approach would 
also invite a rationalizing reconceptualization of the relationship among some 
prominent subcategories within Establishment Clause doctrine that now 
appear more dissonant than harmonious. One important strain of decisions 
involves material support for religious institutions or activities.19 In this 
branch of Establishment Clause doctrine, leading cases have demanded 
 
16 See id. at 2019 (“[L]aws that target the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their 
‘religious status’” trigger strict judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. (quoting Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993))); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 886 n.3 (1990) (“[W]e strictly scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion.”). In 
Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court applied only rational basis review in adjudicating an equal 
protection challenge to a state scholarship program that denied funding for studies designed to 
induce religious faith. 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004). The Court reasoned that because “the program 
is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, . . . we apply rational-basis scrutiny to his equal 
protection claims.” Id. But Locke did not involve a classification based on religious status per se, as 
the Court recently emphasized. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016 (“Davey was not denied a 
scholarship because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—
use the funds to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no question that Trinity Lutheran was denied 
a grant simply because of what it is—a church.” (emphasis in original)). 
17 So far no clear test of permissibility has emerged under the Establishment Clause, especially 
insofar as accommodations for one person result in heightened burdens on another. See Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (discussing that “courts must take adequate account of the 
burdens” that may be imposed on nonbeneficiaries); Kent Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits 
on Free Exercise Accommodations, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 343, 343 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
given us no theory, or no tenable theory, for drawing the line between permissible accommodation 
and impermissible establishment.”). Carl H. Esbeck purports to discern “ten Black Letter Rules that 
fairly restate the cases.” Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations for Religion Violate the Establishment 
Clause: Regularizing the Supreme Court’s Analysis, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 359, 371 (2007). But even his 
portrait is one of complexity and, I would say, consequent indeterminacy. 
18 See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (upholding an affirmative action program as narrowly tailored 
to a compelling governmental interest); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 334 (2003) (same). 
19 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835-36 (2000) (holding that it did not violate the 
First Amendment for a state to provide educational materials for use by religious as well as secular 
schools); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 667-74 (1970) (upholding property tax exemptions for 
religious institutions along with other nonprofit organizations). 
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governmental neutrality,20 both among religions and between religious and 
nonreligious beneficiaries.21 Their categorical formulations suggest that any 
preferences for or among religious institutions or adherents of different faiths 
would violate the Establishment Clause. 
In a second set of cases, however, demands for neutrality vanish, as the 
Supreme Court sometimes tolerates the singling out of religious institutions 
and religious believers for exemptions from otherwise applicable regulatory 
burdens,22 including those of complying with antidiscrimination laws.23 
More confusion enters the picture when one looks at cases involving 
symbolic support for religion. Representative examples arise when the 
government sponsors prayers24 or maintains displays with religious elements, 
such as the Ten Commandments.25 Sometimes the Supreme Court has 
 
20 The term “neutrality” is admittedly a vexed one. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING 
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 15-45 (2013) (cataloguing various senses of the term 
“neutrality” as used throughout American history); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and 
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999-1011 (1990) (differentiating 
among different possible senses of “neutrality”). In Professor Laycock’s terms: 
A law is formally neutral if it does not use religion as a category—if religious and 
secular examples of the same phenomenon are treated exactly the same. Substantive 
neutrality requires neutral incentives. A law is substantively neutral if it neither 
encourages [n]or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, 
observance or nonobservance. 
Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 54 (2007) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). The Supreme Court predominantly uses the term in a formal sense 
to refer to statutes and programs that do not explicitly distinguish between or among religious and 
nonreligious people, activities, or organizations in imposing burdens or distributing benefits. Unless 
the context indicates otherwise, I use the term “neutrality” in this admittedly contestable formal sense. 
21 See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (plurality opinion) (affirming 
that “government may not be overtly hostile to religion” nor “place its prestige, coercive authority, 
or resources behind a single religious faith or behind religious belief in general”). Even cases that 
uphold neutral distributions strongly suggest that neutrality is a necessary predicate for their 
rulings. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (explaining the focus “on 
neutrality and the principle of private choice” in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 
(1993)); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802, 830 (2000) (emphasizing that “[t]he program makes 
a broad array of schools eligible for aid without regard to their religious affiliations or lack thereof”). 
22 See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719-26 (upholding a challenged exemption mandate of the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1987) (holding that 
an exemption provided to the secular nonprofit activities of a religious organization did not violate 
the Establishment Clause). 
23 See generally Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. 327. 
24 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014) (permitting prayers at town 
meetings); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (permitting the Nebraska Legislature’s 
practice of opening with a prayer). 
25 See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 
677, 692 (2005); County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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invalidated such practices.26 Sometimes, however, it upholds them.27 In cases 
of this third, symbolic kind, the Supreme Court cannot credibly require strict 
governmental neutrality toward religion—at least unless or until it is 
prepared to forbid symbolic support for religion altogether.28 Even so, it 
sometimes applies the Lemon test and says that any statute with the 
predominant purpose or effect of promoting religion violates the 
Establishment Clause29—even though it takes formidable machinations to 
conclude that this test would not forbid all symbolic support for religion, 
including such seemingly untouchable practices as the engraving of “In God 
We Trust” on the currency.30 When focused on this set of problems, some of 
the Justices have sometimes maintained that the government violates the 
Establishment Clause only when it engages in coercion or sustained, one-sect 
proselytization.31 But this conclusion fits uneasily with cases involving the 
provision of material benefits to religious institutions and activities, some of 
which appear to imply that any form of non-neutral, preferential treatment 
would violate the Establishment Clause, often without specific reference to 
whether coercion or one-sect proselytization occurs.32 
A fourth strand of cases, cleaved off from the third, comprises challenges 
to religious teaching and practice in the public schools. Cases involving school 
prayer illustrate the distinction. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme 
Court, by 5 to 4, upheld a town’s practice of beginning official meetings with 
a public prayer.33 By contrast, the Court, since the 1960s, has adhered to the 
view that the Constitution prohibits any officially sponsored prayer in the 
public schools.34 
Much if not all of the tension among these strands of cases would 
dissolve if the Supreme Court integrated them into an analytically 
 
26 See, e.g., McCreary Cty., 545 U.S at 881 (affirming the preliminary injunction against the 
display of the Ten Commandments); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (declaring a public 
school’s practice of including prayers as part of the graduation ceremony unconstitutional). 
27 See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (permitting display of a Ten Commandments monument 
on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
28 For the view that the Establishment Clause categorically bars the government from taking 
stands on matters of religious truth in any context, see HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 256-62. But even 
Professor Horwitz acknowledges that judges who refuse rigorously to enforce the principle that he 
espouses “may be right” in light of what he calls “the constitutional easement mess” that arises from 
longstanding violations of that principle and the adverse practical consequences that might ensue 
from judicial efforts to uproot long-ensconced and honored traditions. Id. at 262, 266. 
29 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
30 For discussion, see infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
32 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
33 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014). 
34 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (“We think that by using its public school system 
to encourage recitation of the Regents’ prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly 
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.”). 
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sequenced, tiered-scrutiny framework. Within such a regime, strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review would supplant the ultimate 
tests of constitutional validity that the Court has articulated within the 
various categories that I just distinguished. Yet the categories and the 
principles that the Court has established in constructing them would retain 
the important function of defining diverse rights or interests that the 
Establishment Clause presumptively protects, any infringement of which 
would trigger judicial scrutiny of a specified level. To be slightly more 
concrete, within an analytically sequenced, tiered-scrutiny regime, there 
would be different triggers for the application of elevated scrutiny in cases 
respectively involving governmental expenditures to support religion, 
exemptions of religiously motivated conduct from otherwise applicable 
duties, symbolic support for religion, and religion in the public schools. For 
example, we could recognize that the Establishment Clause creates a 
presumptively protected right or interest in not having tax dollars expended 
on a non-neutral basis to support religious activities, but that it does not 
generate a comparable, presumptively protected right to government 
neutrality with respect to matters of symbolic support. We could also 
recognize, as we should, that the Establishment Clause creates presumptive 
rights not to be classified on the basis of religion for purposes of determining 
one’s statutory obligations or entitlements to benefits. 
Overall, an analytically sequenced, tiered-scrutiny doctrinal structure 
would encourage recognition and embrace of the multifarious values that the 
Establishment Clause protects. At the same time, it would force 
acknowledgment that sufficiently important governmental interests might 
sometimes justify infringements of presumptively protected rights—for 
example, if the government has a compelling interest in employing religious 
classifications to exempt believers from generally applicable laws in order to 
facilitate their free exercise of religion in some ways or under some 
circumstances.35 To expect that all Establishment Clause issues and problems 
could be governed by a few elegant substantive principles that would cut 
across the categories that I outlined above is procrustean if not delusional. 
The second major anomaly in Establishment Clause doctrine involves 
standing. The Establishment Clause has generated a unique body of standing 
law that, ironically, is often misaligned with reigning substantive principles.36 
 
35 For an argument to this effect, see infra notes 227–251 and accompanying text. 
36 To date, the interconnections between standing and merits tests have drawn less scholarly 
attention than one might expect, but have not been wholly ignored. For discussions of standing in 
the context of the Establishment Clause, see Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural 
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1998) (“Of interest here is the Court’s 
general refusal to grant standing in instances of structural violations that result in no ‘injury in 
fact.’”); Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and Separation: How the No-Establishment Rule Does 
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Under other constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has held that 
taxpayers have no standing to complain about allegedly unconstitutional 
taxing and spending programs.37 In Flast v. Cohen, the Court carved out an 
exception for taxpayer standing to challenge governmental spending under 
the Establishment Clause.38 Nearly fifty years later, Flast remains a doctrinal 
lynchpin. But the Court has sharply limited its reach, without explaining 
clearly how standing determinations relate to substantive analysis of the 
rights and interests that the Establishment Clause protects.39 In an effort to 
bring Establishment Clause standing more nearly into line with general 
standing principles, the Court ruled in Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. that “the psychological 
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one 
disagrees . . . is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III, even 
though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms.”40 
The misalignment between merits and standing doctrine emerges when 
one presses the question of how the Supreme Court could have thought 
standing justified in a number of its leading Establishment Clause cases, 
including some in which it has found constitutional violations. Consider, for 
example, cases in which it has ruled on constitutional challenges to 
governmental displays of religious symbols, such as crèches and the Ten 
Commandments, most frequently without any discussion of standing.41 In 
 
(and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 VILL. L. REV. 655, 672 (2009) (arguing that “Flast was wrongly 
decided” based on a correct understanding of the substantive values that the Establishment Clause 
protects); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 120 
(2008) (“Under the broad standing doctrines that have governed for the past several decades, the 
gap between substance and justiciability is relatively narrow.”); William P. Marshall & Gene R. 
Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 
215, 215 (2011) (“In no line of cases over the past half-century has the Supreme Court so directly 
faced the tension between constitutional accountability and jurisdictional traditions of personal 
harm as in the taxpayer standing decisions under the Establishment Clause.”); Richard C. Schragger, 
The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 599 (2011) (discussing 
federal courts’ avoidance of utilizing the nonendorsement norm when considering standing under 
the Establishment Clause). 
37 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347-49 (2006) (acknowledging a “general 
prohibition on taxpayer standing”). 
38 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968). 
39 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 130 (2011) (distinguishing and 
refusing to extend Flast); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) 
(same); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 489-90 (1982) (same). 
40 454 U.S. at 485-86. 
41 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816-17 (2014) (religious invocations at 
public meetings of town board); McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005) (Ten 
Commandments display); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion) (Ten 
Commandments display); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758, 770 
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light of the straitening of taxpayer standing and the forceful rejection of standing 
based on psychological harm in Valley Forge, one might puzzle about who has 
suffered exactly what cognizable injury. Lower courts that have had to struggle 
with such questions have exhibited division and perplexity.42 Adding to the fog, 
the Supreme Court has suggested that there might be some Establishment 
Clause violations that literally no one has standing to challenge.43 
In order to bring substantive principles and standing doctrine under the 
Establishment Clause into a rational, functionally workable equilibrium, the 
Supreme Court needs to acknowledge the necessary interconnections 
between merits and standing inquiries. Only confusion can come from a 
failure—which both the Supreme Court and academic commentators have 
often exhibited—to keep merits and standing issues simultaneously in view.44 
On the surface, taxpayer standing to challenge federal and state governmental 
expenditures in Establishment Clause cases may appear anomalous, because 
comparable taxpayer standing does not exist under other constitutional 
provisions.45 But that anomaly is more apparent than real: the only genuine 
anomaly is a mismatch between substantive and standing doctrines. 
Throughout constitutional law, what counts as an injury adequate to support 
standing should vary with the evils that a particular provision affords 
 
(1995) (cross erected on public property by the Ku Klux Klan); County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 
492 U.S. 573, 589-94 (1989) (crèche); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1984) (crèche). For 
a review of the standing analysis, or lack thereof, in these cases, see generally Ashley C. Robson, 
Measuring a “Spiritual Stake”: How to Determine Injury-in-Fact in Challenges to Public Displays of Religion, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2901, 2925-28 (2013). 
42 See David Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm? Nontaxpayer Standing to Challenge Religious 
Symbols, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1071, 1082-92 (2011) (discussing the varied approaches that 
lower courts have adopted). 
43 See Winn, 563 U.S. at 145 (denying taxpayer standing to challenge tax credits for donations 
to religious education foundations but affirming that “[i]f an establishment of religion is alleged to 
cause real injury to particular individuals, the federal courts may adjudicate the matter”). 
44 This thesis largely accords with the analysis of William A. Fletcher, who argues that the 
question of standing is inseparable from the question of whether a particular party has a right to 
enforce the duties that a particular constitutional or statutory provision creates. The Structure of 
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223-24 (1988). 
45 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347 (2006) (citing plaintiffs’ concession 
that only Establishment Clause cases have offered standing for suits brought by federal taxpayers). 
The rule barring taxpayer standing to challenge expenditures applies to suits involving state and 
federal taxpayers but not to municipal taxpayers challenging municipal expenditures. See Doremus 
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952) (holding that a taxpayer can sue a municipality for 
misuse of spending); Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 609 (1879) (“Of the right of resident tax-
payers to invoke the interposition of a court of equity to prevent an illegal disposition of the moneys 
of the county or the illegal creation of a debt which they in common with other property-holders of 
the county may otherwise be compelled to pay, there is at this day no serious question.”); RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 127 & n.1 (7th ed. 
2015) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (citing Everson v. Bd. Of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)). 
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protection against.46 If the Establishment Clause creates a presumptively 
protected right not to be taxed to support establishments of religion, then 
taxpayers should have standing to complain about expenditures of tax dollars 
that benefit religious institutions or activities—even though it should be a 
further question whether some or all such expenditures ultimately violate the 
Clause. The same logic extends to other contexts. Across the board, the Court 
should recognize that infringements of interests that the Establishment 
Clause protects substantively will normally also confer standing on those 
whose interests are affected most directly. 
In recommending a tiered-scrutiny regime to enforce the Establishment 
Clause and in calling for a realignment of standing doctrine and substantive 
principles, my methodology in this Article is, loosely speaking, doctrinalist 
and coherentist. I assume, though without attempting to prove, that evidence 
bearing on the original meaning of the Establishment Clause is too mixed 
and controverted to justify upsetting relatively settled understandings.47 
 
46 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1070-77 
(2015) [hereinafter Fallon, Fragmentation]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability 
and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 690-704 (2006). 
47 Some commentators believe that the historical background reflected a shared understanding 
of protecting liberty of conscience, especially against governmental taxation to support religious 
institutions, and argue that the modern Court has strayed far from original meanings by seeking to 
enforce values of religious equality. See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 235-49 (2005). Some 
insist that a central or even the sole purpose of the Establishment Clause was to bar federal 
governmental intermeddling in religion, including the state-supported churches that existed in 
seven of the original states. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 34 (1998); 
Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1843, 1891-93 (2006) (arguing that the founders intended to leave the issue of religion in the domain 
of the states). Others, however, adopt a broader view, partly in reliance on positions taken by James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, on whom Justice Black relied in Everson. See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR. 
& JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 97 (4th 
ed. 2016) (asserting that “[r]ead in historical context” the Religion Clauses “can be seen to 
‘embody’—to ‘incorporate’—multiple expressions of the essential rights and liberties of religion,” 
including “religious equality” and “separation of church and state”). Further complexities and 
controversies surround the issue of which Establishment Clause guarantees, if any, the Fourteenth 
Amendment “incorporated” against the states. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, Justice 
Thomas, concurring in the judgment, maintained that the Establishment Clause is “a federalism 
provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation.” 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004). Decades before, in 
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, Justice Brennan sought to refute similar arguments 
by arguing that by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1868, the Establishment 
Clause had emerged and could be understood as a “co-guarantor” of religious liberty along with the 
Free Exercise Clause. 374 U.S. 203, 253-59 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Professor Kurt Lash has 
reached similar but not identical conclusions. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free 
Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1110, 
1141-45 (1994) (discussing religious liberty in the context of military exemptions). In this Article, I 
take stands on none of these historical questions, except to affirm that, in light of historical 
uncertainty and subsequent practice, I do not believe that modern Establishment Clause questions 
should be resolved in exclusive reliance on any reasonably disputable claim about original 
constitutional meaning. 
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Rather than seeking to establish foundational historical or normative 
premises, I propose reforms that would better, less confusingly advance the 
most important commitments that Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
currently embodies. My doctrinal perspective, moreover, is insistently wide-
angled. It seeks to draw insights by comparing Establishment Clause with 
free exercise, equal protection, and free speech doctrine.48 I employ a 
similarly wide-angle approach in emphasizing connections between merits 
and standing issues.49 
The Article unfolds in four main parts. Part I provides an overview of 
modern Establishment Clause doctrine, spanning both its merits and its 
standing dimensions. Part I also identifies an ordered structure of 
Establishment Clause cases and issues, but highlights conflict and disarray 
within that structure. Part II lays out general arguments supporting a 
tiered-scrutiny framework and a better integration of standing doctrine with 
substantive doctrine. Part III applies the general reform strategy developed 
in Part II to a catalogue of substantive issues under the Establishment Clause. 
Part IV advances specific reform proposals with respect to standing. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF MODERN DOCTRINE, ITS ANOMALIES, 
AND ITS CONFUSIONS 
This Part provides an opinionated, introductory survey of Establishment 
Clause doctrine. It consists in large part of a map of disorder. The anomalies and 
confusions that this Part charts, involving both substantive and standing issues, 
will generate and structure the reform agenda that subsequent Parts pursue. 
In laying out modern Establishment Clause doctrine, this Part arrays the 
leading cases into four relatively familiar categories: (1) cases involving 
governmental financial assistance to religious institutions; (2) “accommodation” 
cases in which the government exempts religious institutions or religiously 
motivated actors from legal regulations that otherwise would forbid religiously 
required or compel religiously forbidden action; (3) “symbolic support” cases 
comprising such matters as crèches, Ten Commandments displays, and “In 
God We Trust” on the currency; and (4) cases concerning religion in the 
 
48 For a discussion of parallels and divergences between Establishment Clause and equal 
protection doctrine, see Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality and Entrenchment, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 393, 394-97 (2012). For a partially analogous exploration of disparities between 
Free Exercise Clause doctrine and other bodies of constitutional law, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, 
The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 81-84 (2000). 
49 Even some of the best and otherwise most comprehensive discussions—including KENT 
GREENAWALT, 2 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008), 
and HORWITZ, supra note 1—largely overlook standing issues and the connections between merits-
based and standing analysis. 
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public schools.50 In light of my emphasis in this Part on anomaly and 
confusion, I should point out that an important, implicit premise of the 
categorical scheme that I employ here will escape critique: I do not question 
that the categories that organize this Part successfully define and differentiate 
distinctive doctrinal problems. Moreover, as Part II will argue more explicitly, 
the four categories that I employ here are analytically helpful because they 
implicitly recognize the existence of distinctive rights or interests to which 
the Establishment Clause affords protection, or at least solicitude, of varying 
degrees. In short, diversity and multiplicity in Establishment Clause doctrine 
are endemic and ineradicable. 
Because Establishment Clause cases have notoriously divided the 
Supreme Court, my review of the case law will sometimes focus on divisions 
among the Justices as well as on the positions that prevailed in leading 
decisions. In discussing divisions, I shall sometimes refer to “liberal” and 
“conservative” Justices.51 Despite risks of oversimplification, this approach 
 
50 For analogous classificatory arrangements, see DANIEL O. CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 191 (2016) (dividing the cases into “religion and the public schools,” “religious 
expression and symbolism in other public contexts,” and “public aid to religious schools, 
organizations, and individuals”); WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 47, at 155 (categorizing cases as 
involving religion in the public schools, the place of government in religious schools, and “the place 
of religion in public life and public policy”); Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of 
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 
156 (2004) (discussing the “three major lines of religious liberty cases: funding of religious 
organizations, regulation of religious practice, and sponsorship and regulation of religious speech”). 
I do not claim that absolutely all Establishment Clause cases fit into one of these categories. 
Consistent with that recognized limitation, I make no effort to analyze, or to prescribe frameworks 
for analyzing, other kinds of cases. 
51 What I call “liberals” largely correspond to what others have called “separationists.” See, e.g., 
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 225-28; Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 
62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 231 (1994). According to Professor Horwitz: 
Separationism . . . suggested that “religion should be private rather than public.” 
Second, it meant that any law that lacked a secular purpose was inconsistent with the 
Establishment Clause. Third, read broadly it prohibited a broad variety of common 
government actions that appeared to teach or endorse religion . . . . Fourth, . . . 
separationists argued that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small,” could be used to 
support religion. 
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 227 (footnotes omitted). What I call “conservatives” approximate, though 
less closely, what Professor Horwitz calls “accommodationism”: “Accommodationists argue that the 
Establishment Clause is not violated by laws that attempt to make room for religious beliefs and 
observances that many people hold dear.” Id. at 228. The “conservative” view, as I understand it, also 
includes a reliance on “neutrality” to justify government support for religion in some contexts—for 
example, in the provision of financial assistance to religious institutions—but not in others. At a not 
terribly distant historical point, liberals tended to look sympathetically on demands for religious 
accommodation, but the political valence with regard to accommodation appears to have shifted in 
more recent years. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Justice Brennan’s Accommodating Approach Toward 
Religion, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2187 (2007) (discussing Justice Brennan’s nuanced approach to 
balancing between free exercise rights and prohibition on the establishment of religion). The shift 
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will make it possible to identify points of confusion or inconsistency among 
frequently allied groups of Justices. This categorizing tactic will also aid my 
effort to craft reform proposals that may have different appeals to those who 
are categorized as holding generally liberal or conservative views. It should 
also promote recognition that the positions of both liberal and conservative 
Justices have displayed internal conflicts and inconsistencies. Neither camp 
offers a path to an attractive, coherent doctrinal future. 
A. Cases Involving Material or Financial Support for Religion 
All agree that a tax levied specifically to support a religious institution—
however small the tax might be—would constitute a paradigmatic violation 
of the Establishment Clause.52 Issues arise as the relationship between tax 
levies and support for religious institutions or practice becomes more 
attenuated, typically along one or both of two dimensions. First, most tax 
levies are general, not linked to the promotion of religion. Second, many 
governmental expenditures that benefit religious institutions also provide 
parallel support to secular organizations. 
The two leading modern cases are Mitchell v. Helms53 and Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris.54 Both make neutrality in distribution between religious and 
nonreligious beneficiaries—in the sense of making the same assistance 
available to both, without formal distinction55—a touchstone of constitutional 
permissibility under the Establishment Clause.56 Mitchell upheld a federal 
program that loaned “secular, neutral, and non-ideological” educational 
 
appears to respond at least in part to exemptions of religious institutions and religiously motivated 
service providers from mandates to provide contraceptive coverage to women and from 
antidiscrimination norms otherwise applicable to same-sex weddings and surrounding celebrations. 
On the political and social context of disputes over religious accommodations, see Douglas Laycock, 
Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 846. 
52 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
53 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
54 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
55 With regard to different possible senses of neutrality, see supra note 20. 
56 Earlier cases from the 1970s and 1980s had imposed a more complex and confusing pattern 
of restrictions on the provision of financial benefits to sectarian institutions. See, e.g., Aguilar v. 
Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1985) (finding a New York City program to provide remedial education 
in parochial schools unconstitutional due to the pervasively sectarian environment), overruled by 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1997) (holding that secular education could be funded even 
if it took place on sectarian premises provided that no sectarian indoctrination was permitted); 
Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1985) (striking down a city program to 
provide secular education funding for religious schools), overruled in part by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 
235-36. For discussion of cases from the earlier era, see CONKLE, supra note 50, at 219-22. 
John C. Jeffries, Jr. and James E. Ryan ascribe the rulings during that era to a “pervasive secularism 
that came to dominate American public life, especially among educated elites” and trace subsequent 
changes to shifting political currents that have produced alliances among Catholics and evangelical 
Christians. A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001). 
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materials to both public and private schools.57 Speaking for a plurality of four, 
Justice Thomas wrote that in cases of this kind, “we have consistently turned to 
the principle of neutrality.”58 He continued: “[I]f the government, seeking to 
further some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without 
regard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose, then it is fair to 
say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the effect of furthering 
that secular purpose.”59 Concurring, Justice O’Connor would have added the 
requirement that governmental aid must not actually be used for religious 
purposes—as would happen if, for example, a church-affiliated school 
employed government-loaned materials in the teaching of religious dogma.60 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris upheld a school voucher scheme that provided low 
income parents with financial support for tuition at private schools.61 The 
program allowed parents to cash the vouchers at religious as well as secular 
institutions. Although far more voucher recipients attended parochial than 
secular private schools,62 the Court deemed it decisive that state money found its 
way to religiously affiliated institutions only as a result of private choice.63 The 
majority saw no objection under the Establishment Clause when “neutral 
government programs . . . provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, 
in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their own choosing.”64 
If we look for the basis for standing in challenges to governmental 
expenditures and other distributions of material aid that benefit religious 
institutions, the principal ground comes from Flast. In diverse contexts, the 
Supreme Court has affirmed that standing requires “injury in fact.”65 And 
ordinarily, the Court has held, any purported injury that a taxpayer suffers 
 
57 530 U.S. at 802 (plurality opinion) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1) (1994)). 
58 Id. at 809. Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. 
59 Id. at 810 (citation omitted). 
60 Id. at 840 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
61 536 U.S. 639, 644-48 (2002). 
62 Forty-six of fifty-six private schools participating in the Ohio program at the time of the 
litigation were religiously affiliated. Id. at 655. 
63 Id. at 649 (distinguishing between “government programs that provide aid directly” and 
“programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result 
of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals”). 
64 Id. 
65 For cases explaining that establishing standing requires an injury in fact, a causal link 
between the injury and the action complained of, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decision, see Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 134 (2011) 
(holding that plaintiffs did not have standing as tax payers when the state provided a tuition tax 
credit to private religious schools); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (holding 
that the Earth Island Institute did not have standing because no application of the relevant Forest 
Service regulations threatened imminent harm); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (holding that the environmental group plaintiffs still had 
standing, even after the defendant had come into compliance and ceased the relevant unlawful conduct). 
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from expenditures by the state or federal government does not suffice.66 In 
Flast, the Court crafted an exception. Emphasizing the Establishment 
Clause’s historic purpose of protecting taxpayers from being coerced to 
support a state-sponsored religion, Flast predicated taxpayer standing on the 
satisfaction of a “double nexus” test: “First, the taxpayer must establish a 
logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked 
. . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and 
the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.”67 On the facts 
before it, the Flast Court found that the link between taxpayer status and 
exercises by Congress of the taxing and spending power met the first 
requirement.68 The second nexus, the Court held, existed between taxpayer 
status and the Establishment Clause.69 
Recent decades have witnessed recurring battles aimed at limiting Flast if 
not overthrowing it entirely. The first broadside came in Valley Forge Christian 
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., which held that 
the respondents lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge the donation of 
surplus federal property to a church college.70 According to the majority, “Flast 
limited taxpayer standing” to challenges to enactments under the Taxing and 
Spending Clause.71 Because the legislation that underlay the challenged 
conveyance in Valley Forge was “an evident exercise of Congress’ power under” 
a clause authorizing it to “dispose of” federal property, Flast did not apply.72 
In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., taxpayers challenged a 
number of federal executive actions that, they said, violated the 
Establishment Clause by expending public funds to promote religious 
community groups over secular ones.73 Justice Alito’s plurality opinion—for 
himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy—distinguished Flast on 
the ground that the expenditures at issue did not occur pursuant to any 
particular act of Congress appropriating money for religious groups or 
purposes, but instead stemmed from executive action.74 The other six Justices 
all thought Flast indistinguishable. Justices Scalia and Thomas would have 
 
66 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (distinguishing Flast and 
affirming “the principle, underlying the Article III prohibition on taxpayer suits, that a litigant may 
not assume a particular disposition of government funds in establishing standing”). 
67 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). 
68 Id. at 103-06. 
69 Id. 
70 454 U.S. 464, 482 (1982). 
71 Id. at 479. 
72 Id. at 480, 466 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have power to 
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property 
belonging to the United States . . . .”)). 
73 551 U.S. 587, 592 (2007). 
74 Id. at 605 (plurality opinion). 
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overruled Flast.75 Four dissenting Justices maintained that “[w]hen executive 
agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money for religious purposes, no less 
than when Congress authorizes the same thing, taxpayers suffer injury.”76 
Most recently came Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. 
Winn,77 in which the Court found that a taxpayer lacked standing to challenge 
a scheme of dollar-for-dollar tax credits for donations to organizations that 
support religious schools. A “tax credit is not tantamount to a religious tax or 
to a tithe and does not visit the injury identified in Flast,” Justice Kennedy 
reasoned for a 5-4 majority.78 
Following Valley Forge, Hein, and Winn, one might wonder whether Flast 
hangs by a thread. So far, however, only Justice Thomas and the late Justice 
Scalia have explicitly stated that Flast should be overruled.79 
Nonetheless, a puzzle remains. If we look back at cases in which the Court’s 
conservative Justices applied their neutrality test to uphold statutes providing 
material benefits to religious organizations and activities, it is not clear on what 
basis Justices Scalia and Thomas would have thought that the challengers had 
standing. If not as taxpayers, then how? Strikingly, the Court made no mention 
of standing in either Zelman v. Simmons-Harris or Mitchell v. Helms.80 
In contrast with the Justices who view Flast skeptically, the liberal Justices 
would presumably think standing obvious in cases such as Zelman and Mitchell 
based on Flast’s authority. With regard to the merits, however, the liberals 
dissented in both cases.81 Their preferred tests for gauging governmental 
expenditures that violate the Establishment Clause have tended to be relatively 
fact-specific, focused on the nature and extent of the benefit that religious 
institutions derive from facially neutral programs.82 
 
75 Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
76 Id. at 639 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
77 563 U.S. 125, 130 (2011). 
78 Id. at 142-43. 
79 Id. at 146-47 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, who joined the Hein plurality, wrote 
separately to affirm his commitment to Flast. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 615-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
80 In Zelman, the Court noted in passing that the respondents were “taxpayers,” which may 
have been shorthand for finding standing under Flast. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 
648 (2002). The plurality opinion in Mitchell said nothing about the identity of the respondents, 
see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 803 (2000) (plurality opinion), although Justice Souter 
mentioned in dissent that one of the respondents was a parishioner and parent who objected to the 
provision of government aid to her parish school. Id. at 902 n.20, 913 & n.30 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
81 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 717 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer broke with 
the dissenting liberal Justices in Mitchell to join Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment, 
despite dissenting in Zelman. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
82 See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 726-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (distinguishing school vouchers 
“in both kind and degree from aid programs upheld in the past” under the Establishment Clause); 
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 869 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has isolated no single test of 
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B. Accommodation Cases 
The second category of Establishment Clause cases involves government 
attempts to accommodate religious institutions or religiously motivated 
individuals by carving out exceptions from generally applicable laws. The 
Supreme Court has given a wide but not unlimited berth to such endeavors. 
Cutter v. Wilkinson83 unanimously upheld the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which provides that “[n]o 
government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 
person residing . . . in an institution” unless the burden furthers “a compelling 
governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means.”84 In 
rejecting a facial challenge, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion emphasized that 
RLUIPA “alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private 
religious exercise” and “take[s] adequate account of the burdens a requested 
accommodation may impose on non-beneficiaries.”85 Although Cutter can 
surely be reconciled with prior authorities, it leaves a number of matters 
unexplained, including when and to what extent third-party burdens matter 
to judicial analysis. In 1985, Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. imposed a limit on the 
accommodations that the Establishment Clause will tolerate by invalidating 
a Connecticut mandate “that those who observe a Sabbath any day of the 
week as a matter of religious conviction must be relieved of the duty to work 
on that day, no matter what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the 
employer or fellow workers.”86 Two years later, however, in Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,87 the 
Court upheld an amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act that exempts religious 
organizations from the Act’s prohibitions against employment discrimination on the 
basis of religion. In Amos, the Court found it acceptable that a religiously disfavored 
employee lost his job as a result of the exemption.88 
Among the other issues with which the leading cases fail to come 
convincingly to grips is the conflict framed by attempted accommodations 
that require the government to classify people and institutions based on their 
religious beliefs. If statutes that classify people based on their religious 
beliefs, and accordingly subject them to disparate treatment, were challenged 
under either freedom of thought and association principles that inhere in the 
 
constitutional sufficiency . . . . Particular factual circumstances control, and the answer is a matter 
of judgment.”). 
83 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005). 
84 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2012). 
85 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. 
86 472 U.S. 703, 708-09 (1985). 
87 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). 
88 Id. at 338-39. 
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Free Speech Clause89 or under the equal protection principles that mark 
classifications along religious lines as “suspect,”90 Supreme Court precedents 
would suggest that elevated scrutiny ought to apply.91 Under the 
Establishment Clause, too, one might think religious accommodation statutes 
could best be justified—if and when they are justifiable—on the ground that 
the accommodations are closely tailored to a compelling governmental 
interest. Yet the Supreme Court appears never expressly to have adopted such 
an approach under the Establishment Clause. 
To date, standing has never emerged as an issue in Supreme Court cases 
challenging exceptions to otherwise applicable regulations for religiously 
motivated people and activities. In all of the leading decisions, the challenger 
has suffered a palpable harm, such as the denial of an accommodation or the 
financial burden of needing to accommodate someone else’s wish to engage 
in religiously motivated activities.92 But standing to challenge 
accommodation statutes might be less than obvious in other, imaginable 
cases—for example, if someone alleged that draft exemptions for religiously 
motivated conscientious objectors increased her chances of being conscripted. 
C. Cases Involving Nonmaterial, Symbolic Support for Religion 
A third, recurrently important category of Establishment Clause cases 
involves governmental provision of symbolic support for religion by, for 
example, displaying religious symbols or asserting religious messages. The 
Court’s decisions within this category form a variegated pattern. By closely 
divided votes in every instance, the Court upheld a crèche display in Lynch v. 
Donnelly,93 when the crèche stood alongside other holiday symbols that 
included reindeer, a teddy bear, and hundreds of colored lights,94 but 
invalidated a crèche display in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties 
 
89 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (“[S]tate action 
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny”). 
90 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
91 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) (summarizing equal protection and 
free exercise precedents and concluding that “[j]ust as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws 
that make classifications based on race . . . or on the content of speech . . . so too we strictly 
scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion.”). 
92 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005) (challenging limitations on prisoners’ 
ability to engage in religious exercise); Amos, 483 U.S. at 339 (challenging religiously-based 
employment discrimination); Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985) (challenging 
burdens imposed by a statute granting employees the right to abstain from work on any day they 
designated as a religious Sabbath). 
93 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1983). 
94 Id. at 671. 
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Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter95 when it stood alone.96 The Court ruled that 
a public exhibition of the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment 
Clause in McCreary County v. ACLU,97 but determined that a longer-standing 
Ten Commandments monument, in Van Orden v. Perry,98 did not. The 
Justices long ago invalidated prayer in the public schools,99 and have 
forbidden prayer at school graduation ceremonies,100 but they have allowed 
prayer by legislative chaplains101 and by invited clergy at the beginning of 
public meetings of town government.102 
No cases have so far come before the Court involving what Justice Breyer 
has called “references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of 
public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings; 
[and] the attention paid to the religious objectives of certain holidays, 
including Thanksgiving.”103 These practices are an obvious source of 
discomfiture for judicial liberals, who have often professed adherence to the 
three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which deems a statute or policy invalid 
if it (1) lacks a “secular legislative purpose,” (2) has a “principal or primary 
effect” that either “advances [or] inhibits religion,” or (3) “foster[s] ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”104 William J. Brennan, 
who was the leading liberal Justice of his era, once explained uneasily that 
“such practices as the designation of ‘In God We Trust’ as our national motto, 
or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can 
best be understood . . . as a form [of] ‘ceremonial deism,’ protected from 
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote 
repetition any significant religious content.”105 With regard to the prong of 
the Lemon test that requires statutes to have a secular purpose, Justice 
Brennan apparently proposed—at least for “ceremonial deism” cases—to 
disassociate statutory purposes from the subjective intent of the enacting 
legislature and to deem Lemon satisfied as long as a law or practice “serve[d] 
such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring 
commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply could 
 
95 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989). 
96 Id. at 579-81 (plurality opinion). 
97 545 U.S. 844, 872-74 (2005). 
98 545 U.S. 677, 688-90 (2005). 
99 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
100 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992). 
101 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983). 
102 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822-23 (2014). 
103 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
104 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). In 
Agostini v. Felton, the Court recast the entanglement inquiry as part of the inquiry into a statute’s 
principal or primary effect. 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997). 
105 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
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not be fully served in our culture if government were limited to 
purely non-religious phrases.”106 In other cases, by contrast, Justice Brennan 
and other judicial liberals have understood the “purpose” prong of the Lemon 
test as contemplating inquiry into the actual, subjective, predominant 
intentions of the legislature at the time when it enacted a statute.107 
With all of these cases in mind, the conservative Justices have generally 
rejected the Lemon test and any glosses on it108 as applied to symbolic 
establishment issues. In County of Allegheny, Justice Kennedy wrote for four 
conservatives in arguing that symbolic support for religion does not violate 
the Establishment Clause absent coercion or sustained one-sect 
proselytization.109 In Town of Greece v. Galloway, he relied on historical 
practice in ruling that a town did not contravene the Establishment Clause 
by opening its board meetings with a prayer, which did not necessarily have 
to be nonsectarian.110 
When one stands back to scan the gamut of symbolic support cases, no 
clear test of constitutional validity emerges. In addition to the approaches 
that I have described already, several cases have adopted a suggestion by 
Justice O’Connor and held that a statute has a principal or primary effect of 
promoting religion—and thus fails the Lemon test—if a reasonable, objective 
observer would view its purpose as one of endorsing religion.111 I shall say 
more about this test below. The Court’s opinions in several leading cases have 
eschewed reliance on any general test at all.112 
In addition, standing once again presents puzzles. Consider the 
conservative Justices’ conclusion in County of Allegheny that “the permanent 
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall” would violate the 
Establishment Clause “because such an obtrusive year-round religious display 
would place the government’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on 
 
106 Id. at 717. 
107 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985) (invalidating a statute authorizing a 
period of silence in all public schools “for meditation or voluntary prayer” based on evidence of 
subjective legislative intent to promote prayer). 
108 For a description of a proposed gloss that would use the perspective of objective observer 
to measure a statute’s principal or primary effect, see infra note 111. On conservatives’ rejection of 
that proposed gloss, see infra notes 269–71 and accompanying text. 
109 County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
110 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822 (2014). 
111 See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (upholding the 
examination of legislative purpose as part of the Lemon test but equating purpose with the 
perceptions of a “reasonable observer”); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) 
(quoting Wallace that it is relevant to ask “whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, 
legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement” of 
religion). 
112 See supra note 11. 
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behalf of a particular religion.”113 Despite the conservatives’ acknowledgement that 
a violation would occur, one wonders who, if anyone, they thought would have 
standing to sue to terminate the violation—especially if, for example, a private 
group bought and installed the cross, so that taxpayer standing would not exist. 
The Court’s opinions give no guidance concerning this question. 
Remarkably, in most of the symbolic speech cases that have reached the 
Supreme Court, the Justices’ opinions have not referred to standing.114 
D. Religion in the Public Schools 
In pathbreaking cases decided during the 1960s, the Supreme Court held 
that officially sponsored prayer115 and Bible-reading116 in the public schools 
violated the Establishment Clause. One could imagine that the conservative 
majority that decided Town of Greece v. Galloway would want to reconsider 
the school prayer decisions. But apart from Justice Thomas, who questions 
whether the Establishment Clause should apply to state and local 
governments at all,117 the conservative Justices have not contested the 
principle—traceable to the school prayer cases—that the government must 
not employ its coercive power to compel school attendance to inculcate 
religious belief in impressionable young people.118 In Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe, a 6-3 majority affirmed that the Establishment Clause 
forbids “government speech endorsing religion” in the public schools.119 
Nevertheless, the Justices have divided repeatedly about that principle’s 
proper application. To enforce the requirement of non-endorsement of religion 
in public education, liberals—for so long as they had five votes—often relied on 
the Lemon test to invalidate legislation or policies based on forbidden 
governmental purposes. They did so, for example, in Wallace v. Jaffree, which 
struck down a state statute authorizing a moment of silence “for meditation 
or voluntary prayer” on the ground that the statute had a forbidden purpose 
 
113 492 U.S. 573, 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
114 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
115 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
116 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1963). 
117 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-50 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that “the Establishment Clause is best understood as a 
federalism provision—it protects state establishments from federal interference but does not protect 
any individual rights”—and that it therefore makes little sense to treat it as “incorporated” and 
enforceable against state and local governments). 
118 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 643 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that 
“school prayer occurs within a framework in which legal coercion to attend school (i.e., coercion 
under threat of penalty) provides the ultimate backdrop” and that “the classroom is inherently an 
instructional setting”). 
119 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000). 
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of promoting religion.120 The Court reached a similar conclusion, in Edwards 
v. Aguillard, concerning a statute providing that if public school teachers 
taught evolution, they must also present the alternative theory of “creation 
science.”121 By contrast, conservatives have relatively consistently excoriated 
the Lemon test, as much in school cases as in others. 
In more recent years, a more conservative Court has frequently drawn a 
line between pro-religious speech that occurs within the educational program 
pursuant to government sponsorship—and remains forbidden—and private 
speech occurring within school facilities.122 Pursuant to this distinction, the 
Justices have upheld programs and statutes that grant religious groups and 
speakers the same after-school access to school facilities as their secular 
counterparts.123 Liberals have often dissented, protesting that impressionable 
school children would perceive religious speech and activities on school 
premises as carrying the government’s imprimatur.124 
In the important case of Lee v. Weisman,125 Justice Kennedy split from his 
characteristic conservative allies to join four liberal Justices in holding that 
prayer by a clergyman at a public school graduation ceremony violated the 
Establishment Clause due to coercive aspects of the setting. Impressionable 
students, he reasoned, would experience “public pressure, as well as peer 
pressure . . . to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during 
the invocation and benediction.”126 In his judgment, “[t]his pressure, though 
subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”127 The other 
conservative Justices responded derisively to Justice Kennedy’s finding of 
coercion.128 But they did not doubt that school-sponsored prayer would 
violate the Establishment Clause if it occurred within a school’s instructional 
program.129 
 
120 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
121 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987). 
122 See Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 302. 
123 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that the denial 
of school room use to a private religious organization amounted to unconstitutional discrimination 
against religion); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (enforcing a public 
school’s statutory obligation not to discriminate against a Christian student club and finding that 
the mandate did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
124 See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 142-43 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasizing “the 
particular impressionability of schoolchildren” and calling for “special protection . . . for those in 
the elementary grades” from religious indoctrination). 
125 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
126 Id. at 593. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion 
beyond acts backed by threat of penalty—a brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to 
those of us who have made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than of Freud.”). 
129 Id. at 643. 
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In only one case involving religion in the public schools has the Court 
divided about standing. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the 
Court held, by 5 to 3, that the father of a schoolchild lacked “prudential” 
standing to challenge a daily classroom recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, 
which since 1954 has included the words “under God.”130 Because the girl’s 
mother opposed the action, Newdow, as a matter of California law, could not 
sue as his daughter’s representative, but only on his own behalf.131 Under the 
circumstances, the Court’s majority asserted a discretionary prerogative to 
dismiss the action for want of standing in order to avoid interference with 
relations governed by California family law.132 Dissenting from that ruling, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court had misapplied prudential 
standing principles. In his view, the Court should have decided the case on 
the merits after upholding Article III standing based on a cognizable injury 
to the father’s state-recognized “right to influence his daughter’s religious 
upbringing.”133 For the majority, Justice Stevens did not dispute that the 
father had suffered an injury adequate to permit standing under Article III if 
prudential considerations had not warranted dismissal.134 
In none of its leading cases has the Court ever questioned the standing of a 
student, when suing on her own behalf, to object to being subjected to religious 
teaching or unwanted attempts at religious influence in the public schools. 
Recalling the conservative Justices’ skepticism of claims of injury in other 
contexts, one again might wonder why. One possibility is that student standing 
rests on plausible allegations of injury resulting from coercion—even if no 
coercion is ultimately found to exist. But the Court, without conservative 
objections to the plaintiffs’ standing, has ruled on cases in which the only 
plausible claim of coercion involved coerced exposure (through required school 
attendance) to governmental endorsement of religion. In Stone v. Graham, for 
example, the Court invalidated a state statute that called for public schools to 
display copies of the Ten Commandments paid for by private funds, even though 
the law did not require students to do or say anything. 135 
E. Concluding Observations 
Overall, the existing scheme of Establishment Clause doctrine reveals 
disarray along multiple dimensions. Although the prevailing confusion has many 
 
130 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2002). 
131 Id. at 15-16. 
132 Id. at 17-18. 
133 Id. at 23 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
134 Id. at 18 n.8 (“Even if [Newdow’s] arguments suffice to establish Article III standing, they 
do not respond to our prudential concerns.”). 
135 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
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contributing causes, two related factors stand out. The first is over-ambition by 
shifting coalitions of Justices in seeking to unify Establishment Clause 
doctrine pursuant to a master, substantive test or principle that can apply 
trans-categorically. The Lemon test, which purports to ban all statutes and 
policies with either the predominant purpose or primary effect of promoting 
religion, furnishes the best-known example. Even in its heyday, Lemon invited 
and possibly required evasion and manipulation—for example, in cases 
involving such historically entrenched practices as tax breaks for churches and 
many of the symbolic supports for religion that Justice Brennan sought to 
categorize under the heading of “ceremonial deism.”136 Analogous proposals 
to order the entirety of Establishment Clause doctrine based on a general 
principle of non-coercion and condemnation of one-sect proselytization, 
coupled with a professedly absolute tolerance for other governmental aid to 
religion, seem similarly procrustean. Among other difficulties, conservatives 
have so far failed to align their acknowledgment that one-sect proselytization 
would violate the Establishment Clause with a satisfactory account of who 
would have standing to challenge “the permanent erection of a large Latin 
cross on the roof of city hall.”137 
A second major contributor to doctrinal incoherence is a tendency by the 
Supreme Court to craft Establishment Clause doctrine without taking a 
sufficiently wide-angle view of the constitutional landscape. One vivid example 
involves the misalignment of merits and standing doctrines. Another resides in 
the Justices’ failure to draw lessons from doctrines in other constitutional 
domains that apply tiers of scrutiny and take account of governmental interests 
that can sometimes justify prima facie infringements of individual rights. 
II. ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGY FOR REFORM 
This Part lays out a general, two-part strategy for the rehabilitation of 
Establishment Clause doctrine. One aspect proposes a scheme of analytically 
sequenced, tiered judicial scrutiny analogous to that used to enforce the Free 
Speech, Free Exercise, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. This 
proposal is bold in one respect: tiered scrutiny plays no visible role under 
current Establishment Clause law. But my suggestion is modest in another way: 
rather than starting from scratch, it calls for distilling the rights and interests 
that would trigger elevated judicial scrutiny from existing doctrinal categories. 
The other primary suggested reform involves the realignment of standing 
 
136 See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
137 County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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doctrine in light of the rights and interests that the substantive components of 
Establishment Clause doctrine implicitly or explicitly recognize. 
This Part focuses more on conceptual foundations than on doctrinal detail. 
Part III will offer specific recommendations for implementing the reform 
agenda that this Part lays out with regard to substantive Establishment Clause 
doctrine. Part IV will do the same with respect to standing. 
A. Embracing and Implementing a Regime of Sequenced, Tiered Judicial Scrutiny 
My proposal for a regime of analytically sequenced, tiered judicial 
scrutiny requires defense and elaboration along two main dimensions. First, 
I argue that there are important benefits to tiered review that analyzes 
presumptive violations of protected rights in light of potentially justifying 
governmental interests. Second, I offer an attractive, workable approach to 
identifying the presumptively protected rights or interests any infringement 
of which would call for more or less searching judicial review. 
1. In Defense of Tiers and a Weighing of Governmental Interests 
The case for an analytically sequenced, tiered scheme of judicial review 
begins with the premise that Establishment Clause cases—like those 
under the Free Speech, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Free Exercise 
Clauses—often present conflicts between competing values of 
fundamental constitutional significance. One example arises when the 
government classifies citizens on the basis of their religious beliefs for the 
purpose of sparing religious believers from needing to choose between 
breaching their religious duties and violating the secular law. On the one 
hand, religiously-based classifications pose dangers of division and 
unfairness that make such classifications suspect under the Equal 
Protection Clause.138 On the other hand, the government has powerful 
reasons, rooted in free exercise values, to want to spare citizens the cruel 
choice of deciding whether to disobey either the government or their God.139 
Another example resides in longstanding practices of granting tax advantages 
and various forms of material assistance—which can range from police and 
fire protection to support for parochial schools—to churches or religious 
activities. In light of well-justified anxieties about taxation to support 
religious institutions, direct and indirect financial assistance ought to be 
regarded as threatening interests that the Establishment Clause protects. But 
sometimes such aid might be justified by sufficiently important governmental 
 
138 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
139 See infra notes 232–61 and accompanying text. 
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interests—for example, in preventing crime or in ensuring that students who 
choose to attend parochial schools receive competent instruction in secular 
subjects.140 Some, of course, would argue that there is no sufficiently 
important government interest in the latter of these two cases. Whatever 
one’s view about the strength of the government’s interest, my principal point 
is simply that a clash of values is involved that constitutional doctrine and 
judicial analysis ought to acknowledge and address openly. 
As surveyed in Part I, Establishment Clause doctrine has never 
recognized that sufficiently important or compelling governmental interests 
could justify the infringement of presumptively protected rights.141 But 
insistence that government interests have no role in determining the success 
of Establishment Clause claims is either dishonest or myopic, as on the 
disorderly doctrinal pattern that emerged from Part I conclusively attests. 
Existing law does not accord absolute protection to all interests grounded in 
the Establishment Clause, nor could it sensibly do so. If consideration of 
competing values does not occur on the surface of the doctrine, it manifestly 
happens beneath. And it would be unwarrentedly single-minded to exclude 
values that compete with Establishment Clause-based interests and concerns 
wholly from account. 
Within constitutional law, value conflict is of course not unique to the 
Establishment Clause. There is, and should be, no single prevailing approach. 
But in other contexts that involve clashes of important constitutional values, 
the Supreme Court has evolved a framework of analytically sequenced, tiered 
judicial review that is designed to recognize the constitutional (and often the 
moral) complexity of collisions between genuinely fundamental rights, which 
ought not be lightly “balanced” away, and governmental interests of high 
importance.142 That framework asks first whether a fundamental right is 
implicated or infringed. If so, it shifts the burden to the government to establish 
that a sufficiently compelling governmental interest justifies the challenged 
practice. In cases subject to “strict” judicial scrutiny, infringements of 
fundamental rights fail judicial review unless “necessary” or “narrowly tailored” 
to promote a “compelling” governmental interest.143 A slightly weaker variant 
of analytically sequenced, tiered analysis is intermediate scrutiny, under which 
 
140 See infra notes 203–26 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. 
142 See generally Fallon, supra note 2, at 1293-94 (explaining the historical emergence of 
“fundamental rights” protected by the “strict scrutiny” formula as “a restraint on the impulse to 
balance away civil liberties”). 
143 E.g. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2209-14 (2016); Citizens United v. FEC, 
588 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). For discussion of 
indeterminacies in this formula and vagaries in its application, see Fallon, supra note 2. 
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courts ask a question such as whether the infringement of a right is substantially 
related to important governmental interests.144 
Although not perfect by anyone’s lights, analytically sequenced, tiered 
scrutiny successfully highlights clashes of values and promotes nuanced 
analysis in cases involving arguably justifiable infringements of fundamental 
rights. An important indicator of the attractiveness of an analytically 
sequenced, tiered-scrutiny regime comes from comparisons of U.S. doctrine 
with the constitutional law of other nations. An emerging international 
consensus recognizes that the judicial protection of fundamental rights best 
follows a two-staged sequence, involving an initial determination of whether 
a right or interest is presumptively protected and, if so, a further inquiry into 
whether it must yield to sufficiently important countervailing interests. The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms exemplifies this design when it 
states that “guarantees of the rights and freedoms set out in it [are] subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.”145 An even more prominent 
example of analytically sequenced judicial analysis involves the 
proportionality review that many liberal democracies—including a number of 
western European nations, post-Communist states in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Israel, South Africa, and New Zealand—use to enforce fundamental 
rights.146 Under it, courts first ask whether fundamental rights have been 
restricted. If so, they apply a multifactor test to determine whether ultimate 
violations should be found.147 
 
144 This is perhaps the most familiar formulation of an intermediate scrutiny test, introduced 
for cases involving gender discrimination in Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating a 
statute that established different drinking ages for men and women). For the most recent 
formulation in a case involving gender-based discrimination, emphasizing any disparity must have 
an “exceedingly persuasive” justification, see Sessions v Morales-Santana. 137 S.Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017) 
(holding that a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act violated equal protection by giving 
unmarried women a preference over unmarried men (and married couples) in conferring their U.S. 
citizenship on children born abroad). On alternative formulations of intermediate scrutiny tests in 
other doctrine contexts, see Fallon, supra note 2, at 1299-1301. 
145 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
146 See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 72, 74 (2008) (describing the spread of proportionality analysis 
from Germany to other countries in Europe and beyond); see also Carlos Bernal Pulido, 
The Migration of Proportionality Across Europe, 11 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 483, 499-500 (2013) (listing 
states where proportionality analysis has been adopted); Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, 
Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 463, 465 (2011) 
(documenting the spread of proportionality analysis). 
147 In its original German form, proportionality review consists of a three-stage analysis that 
asks whether (1) a legislative measure restricting basic rights is rationally related to a desired end, 
(2) the measure impairs the right or freedom in question as little as possible, and (3) an infringement 
of rights is proportionate to the desired objective. See Francis G. Jacobs, Recent Developments in the 
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The clarifying benefits of applying a sequenced, tiered-scrutiny regime to 
the Establishment Clause begin to emerge at the first step of analysis. The 
step-one question is whether a challenged governmental action comes within 
the “coverage,”148 or the ambit of protective concern, of a constitutional 
provision such as the Establishment Clause. One could restate this question 
as whether the government has impinged on a presumptive constitutional 
right or a fundamental interest. This is an important inquiry, meant to 
identify fundamental rights or interests any infringement of which ought to 
occasion suspicion and trigger searching judicial review. As I shall emphasize 
below, not every alleged violation of the Establishment Clause should survive 
this threshold inquiry and thereby provoke elevated scrutiny. (To foreshadow 
a concrete example, some expressions of symbolic governmental support for 
religion, such as printing “In God We Trust” on the currency, should not be 
deemed to violate any presumptively protected rights.149) 
If the step-one threshold is surmounted, analytically sequenced, tiered 
frameworks thrust a burden of justification onto the government to demonstrate 
that a challenged action or practice both serves important goals and minimizes 
harm to protected values or interests. Importantly, the step-two analysis calls 
for more than mere “balancing.” The demand for the government to justify 
its infringement on a right or interest by demonstrating close tailoring to a 
compelling (or in some cases an important) governmental interest takes 
seriously the fundamentality of the rights-based interests at stake. 
Some may insist that the Establishment Clause demands an even more 
categorical analysis, partly because of its structural function in ensuring 
separation between secular government and religion. There is rhetorical power 
in the protest that the Constitution recognizes no possible justification for a 
practice that is properly deemed to be “an establishment of religion.”150 But this 
formulation is either tautological or question-begging. Within an elevated 
scrutiny framework, the question is not whether an establishment of religion 
 
Principle of Proportionality in European Law, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE 
LAWS OF EUROPE 1, 1 (Evelyn Ellis, ed., 1999); see also NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 268 (1996). Different 
jurisdictions now use somewhat varied protocols. See Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About 
Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENTARY 803, 806-07 (2004) (book review). For a comparative 
discussion of proportionality doctrine as exercised in French, Belgian, Dutch, and British law, see 
Walter Van Gerven, The Effect of Proportionality on the Actions of Member States of the European 
Community: National Viewpoints from Continental Europe, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 37, 37 (Evelyn Ellis, ed., 1999). For an exploration of the limited use of 
proportionality principles in U.S. constitutional law, see Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an 
Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 2680 (2015). 
148 Schauer, supra note 3. 
149 See infra notes 262–83 and accompanying text. 
150 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 1276-77. 
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can be justified. It is whether a practice that exhibits certain hallmarks of an 
establishment of religion should ultimately be condemned as constituting one. 
The narrow tailoring of a particular practice to a compelling governmental 
interest would indicate that it is not an “establishment of religion” in the 
forbidden sense and ultimately violates no constitutional right. 
As I have argued, moreover, any purported absolutism is almost inevitably 
more of a façade than a reality, due to the need to accommodate competing 
values. Historically entrenched practice and precedent further undermine 
arguments for rules that would dismiss otherwise compelling governmental 
interests as categorically irrelevant. It is both desirable, and ample, that step-one 
determinations that the government has infringed a fundamental right or interest 
under the Establishment Clause should shift the burden to the government to 
demonstrate that it has an unusually potent justification for doing so. 
In touting sequenced, tiered scrutiny, I make no claim to offer a panacea. 
Especially in recent years, the Supreme Court has sometimes blurred the sharp 
lines between strict scrutiny and rational basis review, with a resulting diminution 
in those categories’ analytically structuring benefits.151 In addition, the Supreme 
Court has never laid down rigorous criteria for the derivation of compelling 
governmental interests.152 Nevertheless, schemes of sequenced, tiered scrutiny 
have endured because of their capacity to structure and discipline judicial 
judgment, and thereby to enable illuminating comparisons, even in the absence 
of algorithmic determinacy. In the context of the Establishment Clause, elevated 
judicial scrutiny—which recognizes the suspect character of certain governmental 
classifications, but permits them in cases of narrow tailoring to important 
interests—would invite a more appropriately honest and searching analysis than 
currently available doctrinal templates elicit. 
2. Identifying Presumptively Protected Interests, Rights, and Values 
Though sometimes daunting, the first-stage judicial inquiry into whether 
challenged governmental action infringes presumptively protected rights 
should not prove unmanageable under the Establishment Clause. To 
determine which rights or interests properly trigger elevated scrutiny, the 
Supreme Court should begin by excavating the presuppositions of the 
doctrinal categories that Part I surveyed. When carefully examined, those 
categories exhibit an immanent logic in defining distinctive rights and 
interests that require differentiated forms of judicial protection. However 
confused the patterns of Supreme Court decisions that Part I reviewed may 
 
151 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
152 See Note, Let the End Be Legitimate: Questioning the Value of Heightened Scrutiny’s Compelling- 
and Important-Interest Inquiries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1408-09 (2016). 
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appear on the surface, the leading cases embody articulable, sensible, and 
often compelling assumptions about guiding Establishment Clause interests 
and values, as reflected in judicially recognized rights. As Part I’s doctrinal 
summary manifests, these include rights—which admittedly need to be better 
defined and delimited—(a) not to be taxed to support religion, (b) not to be 
classified and unreasonably disadvantaged on the basis of religion, (c) not to 
be symbolically demeaned or marginalized by governmental endorsement of 
religion, or coerced into participating in a religious exercise, and (d) not to 
be subjected to governmentally sponsored religious instruction or 
endorsement as an aspect of public education. 
Among this category-based catalogue of rights—none of which is 
necessarily absolute in the face of competing governmental interests—the 
protected interest in not being taxed to support religion is easily, intuitively 
comprehensible and should command nearly universal assent. Everson v. 
Board of Education, which many commentators view as having initiated the 
modern era of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, said flatly that “[t]he 
‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: 
. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions.”153 Against the backdrop of history, this 
proclamation reflects a forceful, normatively attractive claim of individual 
right: the Establishment Clause protects each of us against being taxed or 
otherwise coerced to support a religion to which we do not subscribe.154 The 
precise contours of this right may be in doubt (for example, in cases in which 
general tax revenues flow to churches among other institutions), but its core 
is not. One important rationalizing task—which Part III pursues in detail—
is to define the relevant right and to determine the nature of the judicial 
protection that it deserves. 
The right that is implicit in the second category of cases that Part I 
reviewed—not to be classified and unreasonably disadvantaged on the basis 
of religion—is also normatively compelling and derives from values of 
religious nonpreferentialism and equal citizenship.155 Once again the exact 
scope of the right is uncertain and debatable. Throughout history, some 
 
153 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
154 See FELDMAN, supra note 47, at 41 (“In the debates that led up to the drafting and 
ratification of the First Amendment . . . all condemned use of coercive taxes to support religious 
institutions with which the taxpayer might disagree.”). 
155 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 4-9 (2007); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations 
of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 12-13 (2004) (“I will suggest that understanding the 
proper place of equality in religion clause jurisprudence requires appreciation of a broader range of 
values with regard to both religion clauses, and a recognition that this appreciation is itself 
independently important.”). 
2017] Tiers for the Establishment Clause 91 
statutory and even constitutionally mandated accommodations—in the form 
of exemptions from otherwise applicable regulatory obligations—have 
existed.156 In some instances, third parties have had to bear costs.157 
Nonetheless, a right not to be substantially burdened by religious 
classifications and benefits for others presumptively obtains, and for readily 
understandable reasons. Even in cases having nothing to do with taxation to 
support religion, history has shown religion-based classification to be 
dangerous.158 When the government employs such classifications, it should, 
accordingly, bear a significant burden of justification. 
The third kind of Establishment Clause right that emerges from a 
category-based analysis—not to be demeaned or marginalized on the basis of 
religion, and certainly not to be coerced into religious practice—requires 
more complex explication.159 As a doctrinal matter, it seems incontrovertible 
that not all governmental expressions of symbolic support for religion 
infringe constitutionally protected interests or violate individual rights, no 
matter how acute the psychological sense of grievance that a particular 
plaintiff may feel.160 Some uses of religious symbols, such as the engraving of 
“In God We Trust” on the currency, fall into a category of what 
Professor Greenawalt calls “mild endorsement” that the Supreme Court—
 
156 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original 
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1837 (2006) (“From the late 
seventeenth century to the present, there is an unbroken tradition of legislatively enacted regulatory 
exemptions. James Ryan, using a Lexis search and sampling techniques, estimated that there were 
2000 religious exemptions on state and federal statute books in 1992.”). 
157 See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1987) (upholding an exemption of religious organizations from a 
prohibition against religious discrimination that resulted in an employee losing his job). 
158 David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 577 (2002) (“Religious division is renowned throughout history”). 
159 Professor Feldman views such a right as lacking original historical support and traces its 
origins to McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). FELDMAN, supra note 47, at 50-53, 
177-82. Nonetheless, Professor Feldman characterizes the views that support this right as the modern 
“orthodoxy.” Id. at 201-03. 
160 Steven G. Gey argues strongly that there are no trivial constitutional violations. “Under 
God,” the Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865 (2003) (rejecting 
a triviality defense used in the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the inclusion of “under 
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause); see also Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36-37 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“There are 
no de minimis violations of the Constitution—no constitutional harms so slight that the courts are 
obliged to ignore them.”). Although this claim may be true, it is a different question whether a particular 
provision of the Constitution confers judicially enforceable protection against a particular kind of 
asserted injury that can be categorized as de minimis as a matter of law. Cf. Laycock, supra note 50, at 
235 (“The de minimis exception makes sense as a prudential judgment not to pay the costs of absolutist 
enforcement of an unpopular rule, but it is hard to make the line appear principled.”). 
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whether for better or for worse—plainly regards the Constitution as 
tolerating. 161 
Nevertheless, as I emphasized above, Establishment Clause doctrine also 
teaches that exhibitions of governmental support for religion violate 
individual rights in some cases. Moreover, the violations are not restricted to 
instances in which people are taxed to support a church or classified and 
subjected to disfavored treatment on account of their religious beliefs. An 
additional category comprises practices that have the practical effect of 
stigmatizing or marginalizing particular individuals based on their status as 
religious outsiders. The modern Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized as 
much, including in its sometime reliance on an “objective observer” test 
aimed at identifying practices that carry a message of outsider status to some 
members of the sponsoring community.162 Establishment Clause interests 
and values become implicated when, as Justice O’Connor put it in Lynch v. 
Donnelly,163 governmental actions have the symbolic effect of “send[ing] a 
message to nonadherents [of a favored religion] that they are outsiders.”164 In 
sum, it is impossible to make sense of all of the decided cases without 
recognizing that the Establishment Clause creates rights against 
governmentally sponsored actions and displays that give rise to coercion, 
stigmatization, or marginalization in matters involving governmentally 
preferred religion. What is more, the values that would support recognition 
of such rights are inherent in ideas of equal citizenship and religious 
freedom.165 
The fourth right that Part I implicitly identified—involving a right of 
children not to be subjected to governmental endorsement of religion in the 
coercive aspects of public school education, and of parents not to have their 
children socialized into religious belief through governmental endorsement 
of religion in the public schools—stands largely on its own bottom. The 
general right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, which is 
 
161 See GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 101. As Greenawalt summarizes, “factors [that] are 
relevant” to the aptness of this characterization include “the inclusiveness of the view that is 
endorsed, historical pedigree, [and] the brevity of references to religion.” Id. 
162 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-10 (2000); County. of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
163 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
164 Id. at 688. 
165 Eisgruber and Sager ascribe to the Religion Clauses an “equal liberty” theory that forbids 
governmental action that demeans anyone based on his or her religious commitments, but that 
affirmatively protects religion only through a scheme of generally applicable rights that allow 
religion to flourish without characterizing religious practice or belief as especially deserving of 
solicitude. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 155, at 4-9. 
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rooted in the Due Process Clause,166 forms a part of the picture. Nevertheless, 
the Establishment Clause both generates independent rights in the children 
themselves and sharpens and buttresses parental rights. As the Court said in 
Engel v. Vitale, “the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an 
establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part 
of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of 
the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by 
government.”167 In addition, children who are frequently coerced into public 
school attendance should possess a right to be free of unwanted religious 
proselytization, and thus of possible subtle pressures to assimilate to majority 
norms, during school attendance and related activities.168 
B. Aligning Standing and Merits Doctrine 
Sound analysis under the Establishment Clause requires an 
appreciation of how standing and substantive doctrine relate to one 
another. In thinking about standing as about substantive constitutional 
principles, analysis should begin with an appraisal of the rights or 
interests that the Establishment Clause protects, whether to a greater or 
a lesser degree. Some prominent commentators disagree. For example, 
Professors Lupu and Tuttle maintain that the Establishment Clause is a 
purely “structural,” as opposed to a rights-conferring, provision.169 This 
characterization mistakes a genuine but partial insight for a categorical truth. 
Sensibly interpreted in the light of case law and history, the Establishment 
Clause has a structural aspect.170 It embodies a constitutional commitment to 
 
166 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the “liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”). 
167 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992) (“[O]ur 
precedents do not permit school officials to assist in composing prayers as an incident to a formal 
exercise for their students.”). 
168 See id. at 594 (“Assuming, as we must, that the prayers were offensive to the student and 
the parent who now object, the intrusion was both real and, in the context of a secondary school, a 
violation of the objectors’ rights.”). 
169 IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS 
PEOPLE 4-20 (2014); see Esbeck, supra note 36, at 3-4 (maintaining that “the Supreme Court’s 
case law is more easily understood when the Establishment Clause is conceptualized as a 
structural restraint on the government’s power to act on certain matters pertaining to religion” 
than as a rights-conferring provision); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 
49 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (characterizing the Establishment Clause as a 
“federalism” rather than a rights-conferring provision). 
170 The structural aspect manifests itself, for example, in cases holding that civil courts lack the 
competence to review whether church tribunals act in accord with church law or doctrine. See, e.g., 
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976) (holding that civil courts 
may not inquire whether religious governing bodies had power to decide religious disputes); 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (invalidating 
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maintaining the separation of church and state for reasons that include the 
healthy, autonomous functioning of churches as well as the desirability of a 
secular government, not entangled in religious debates and jealousies.171 But 
it implies no disparagement of the Establishment Clause’s structural features 
to insist that the American constitutional tradition also recognizes the 
Establishment Clause as a safeguard of individual rights.172 
Indeed, if the Establishment Clause did not create individual rights, there 
often would be no one with either standing or a cause of action to sue to 
enforce its strictures. Although the Supreme Court sometimes distinguishes 
between a plaintiff ’s standing and her legal authorization to bring suit, and 
equates standing with injury,173 the Court normally insists that no one can sue 
in federal court, even if she is injured, unless some valid source of law 
authorizes her action.174 Almost invariably, moreover, legal authorization to 
sue depends on the possession of a legal right.175 As the Supreme Court said 
in the canonical case of Marbury v. Madison, “The province of the court is, 
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.”176 
 
a New York statute that transferred power over Russian Orthodox churches from the churches’ 
Russian hierarchy to church authorities in the U.S). 
171 See FELDMAN, supra note 47, at 24 (noting that for the founder of Providence Plantations, 
Baptist theologian and preacher Roger Williams, the metaphorical wall of separation between church 
and state that was later celebrated by Thomas Jefferson protected the “garden” of the church from 
the “wilderness” of government). 
172 See, e.g., CONKLE, supra note 50, at 154-55 (characterizing the Establishment Clause as 
embodying both structural and rights-based values); Shiffrin, supra note 155 (emphasizing the 
plurality of Establishment Clause purposes and values). 
173 See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970) 
(“The ‘legal interest’ test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart 
from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the 
complaint is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or 
constitutional guarantee in question.”). 
174 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383-84 (2015) (holding 
that plaintiffs’ suit could not proceed because they lacked a cause of action under the Supremacy 
Clause or any other source of authorizing law); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) 
(dismissing a suit in the absence of a statutorily authorized cause of action). 
175 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 249-52 (1991) (distinguishing among “primary” rights, causes of action, 
and remedial rights and describing the confluence that must exist for a party to have a right to sue). 
176 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). The dependence of a party’s capacity to sue in federal 
court on the existence of a right is most vividly illustrated in suits alleging constitutional violations 
by state and local officials. For the most part, the authorization to bring such suits comes from 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), which requires plaintiffs to allege deprivation of constitutional “rights, 
privileges, or immunities.” As the Supreme Court emphasized in Armstrong, a mere allegation that 
state officials have violated the Supremacy Clause by failing to adhere to the dictates of federal law 
will not give rise to a right to sue in federal court in the absence of an asserted violation of a federally 
protected right, even if the suing party has unquestionably suffered injury and possesses Article III 
standing. 135 S. Ct. at 1384; cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 
1435, 1448-52 (2013) (arguing that private parties lack rights under most structural constitutional 
provisions and therefore should have no standing to complain of such provisions’ violation). 
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Recognition that the Establishment Clause has both rights-creating and 
structural aspects finds a close parallel in Article III: the Supreme Court has not 
only acknowledged, but also emphasized, that Article III functions as both a 
structural safeguard of judicial power and a guarantee of rights to individuals.177 
We should think similarly about the Establishment Clause. Otherwise we would 
need either to view the Establishment Clause as unenforceable through the 
judicial process in many cases or to invent principles for standing that diverge 
radically from those that govern the rest of constitutional law.178 No adequate 
reason exists to embrace either of these options. 
Once we recognize that the Establishment Clause creates rights in order 
to protect a set of underlying interests such as those that subsection A.2 of 
this Part picked out, the linkage between standing and merits issues becomes 
unmistakable. The Supreme Court has held recurrently and insistently that 
standing to sue depends on injury in fact.179 But whether a party has suffered 
 
In Bond v. United States, which involved a challenge to a criminal conviction under state law, the 
Supreme Court asserted that a party who satisfies Article III standing requirements can assert a 
constitutional claim based on structural principles of constitutional federalism as long as the litigant 
satisfies the Court’s “prudential” standing rules. 564 U.S. 211, 225-26 (2011). Normally, however, 
prudential standing rules govern when one party can assert another’s rights, not structural principles 
of constitutional law. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 161-68. Moreover, if Bond were 
taken to establish that parties can routinely sue to enjoin governmental practices that violate purely 
structural principles, its ruling would be hard to square with myriad cases holding that plaintiffs 
cannot sue in federal court in the absence of a congressionally, constitutionally, or judicially 
authorized cause of action. By contrast, the result in Bond could be easily explained as an application 
of the longstanding principle that every actual or potential defendant in a criminal enforcement 
proceeding “has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law,” even if 
the invalidity depends on structural constitutional norms. Bond, 564 U.S. at 226 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). For elaboration and defense of the principle that defendants have a personal right not 
to be subjected to judicial sanctions unless pursuant to constitutionally valid norms, see Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1331-
32 (2000) (“If the statute under which a defendant is convicted is invalid . . . the defendant’s 
conviction must be reversed for the sole and simple reason that there is no constitutionally valid 
rule of law under which the defendant could be sanctioned . . .”); Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (arguing that the Constitution forbids the imposition of 
sanctions except pursuant to a valid rule of law). 
177 See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015) (affirming that 
“[t]he entitlement to an Article III adjudicator is ‘a personal right’” but that it “also serves a 
structural purpose” and therefore creates now-waivable limits on congressional power to transfer 
jurisdiction to non-Article III tribunals); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1986) (“Article III 
§1 serves both to protect the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of 
the tripartite government and to safeguard litigants’ rights to have claims decided before judges who 
are free from potential domination by other branches of government.” (internal citations omitted)). 
178 Although those principles are themselves multifarious, the linkage among standing, rights, 
and causes of action is a relative constant. See Fallon, Fragmentation, supra note 46, at 1070-80. 
179 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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injury in the constitutional sense depends on the provision that she seeks to 
enforce. The Supreme Court so recognized in Flast v. Cohen.180 
Flast’s insight in linking the injuries that will support standing to the 
substantive guarantees of a particular constitutional provision finds ample 
corroboration in non–Establishment Clause cases.181 The equal protection 
case of Heckler v. Mathews offers a potent analogy.182 In Heckler, a challenged 
statute gave larger Social Security benefits to women than to men with 
identical employment records.183 The statute further provided that if a court 
should find the disparity unconstitutional, women’s benefits would fall to the 
men’s level.184 Despite the inability of male plaintiffs to achieve any material 
benefit from a ruling in their favor, the Court held that the mere denial of equal 
treatment constituted a cognizable injury.185 In affirmative action cases, the Court 
has similarly held that the denial to white plaintiffs of the opportunity to compete 
for jobs or educational opportunities on a race-neutral basis constitutes an 
actionable injury, even if those plaintiffs would not have received the jobs or 
educational opportunities anyway.186 In these cases, as in Flast, the standing 
analysis turns centrally on what the constitutional provision in question protects 
against—and on the closely related question of whom the Constitution protects 
against the kind of violation at issue. 
In some areas of standing doctrine, the Supreme Court has expressed 
skepticism of claims of injury shared by large numbers of the public.187 But 
where many citizens all possess interests that a rights-conferring provision of 
 
180 See 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) (upholding standing based on the historically central 
Establishment Clause purpose of protecting taxpayers against being coerced to support religion). 
181 See Fallon, Fragmentation, supra note 46, at 1070-80. 
182 465 U.S. 728 (1984). 
183 Id. at 732-33. 
184 Id. at 734, 736-37. 
185 Id. at 737 (holding the plaintiff retained standing despite the severability clause “because 
the right asserted by appellee is the right to receive ‘benefits . . . distributed according to 
classifications which do not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered [applicants] 
solely on the basis of sex,’ and not a substantive right to any particular amount of benefits” (alteration 
and omission in original) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 647 (1975))); see also 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698-700 (2017) (reaffirming the holding of 
Heckler v. Mathews that disparity of treatment constitutes actionable injury in cases alleging equal 
protection violations). 
186 See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 
656, 666 (1993); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
187 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984) (rejecting a claim of standing based 
on stigmatic injury that would “extend nationwide to all members of the . . . racial groups” at issue); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“[T]he Court has held that when the asserted harm is a 
‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that 
harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”); United States v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974) (describing the problems involved in finding standing for “plainly 
undifferentiated” harms). 
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the Constitution protects—as with the Fourteenth Amendment’s one-person, 
one-vote principle,188 or the protections that the Establishment Clause affords 
against being taxed to support a church189—the Court has recognized that the 
broadly shared character of a right or interest does not disqualify it from 
affording a basis for standing. Insofar as post-Flast cases involving standing 
to enforce the Establishment Clause signal a retreat from that recognition, 
they deserve to be rethought. 
In sum, any suggestion that the Establishment Clause might violate 
individual rights, but that no one would have standing to vindicate those 
rights, would not identify a constitutional anomaly, but assert a constitutional 
contradiction in terms. In United States v. Richardson,190 the Supreme Court 
affirmed that there may be some provisions of the Constitution that literally 
no one has standing to enforce. Richardson involved the Statement and 
Account Clause, which requires Congress to provide regular accounts of 
federal spending.191 Some have characterized this clause as not creating 
individual rights.192 As I have argued, however, it is not plausible to make that 
claim about the Establishment Clause. 
Acknowledgment that the recognition of constitutional rights also implies 
the existence of standing to enforce those rights does not entail that anyone 
or everyone always has standing to sue to enforce the Establishment Clause, 
any more than any other provision of the Constitution. Among other 
considerations, although what counts as an injury for standing purposes 
depends on the rights or interests that particular constitutional provisions 
protect, the reciprocal relationship also holds: sound constitutional 
interpretation may find no judicially enforceable constitutional rights in the 
absence of plausible claims of individual injury.193 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court should recognize that infringements of constitutionally protected 
interests under the Establishment Clause—such as those that I provisionally 
identified in subsection A.2 of this Part—will normally support standing. 
 
188 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (finding standing and distinguishing between 
interests in voting without arbitrary impairment and interests in having the government act 
according to law). 
189 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968). 
190 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
191 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“[A] regular statement and account of the receipts and 
expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.”). 
192 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 44, at 270 (“The Court’s decision in Richardson makes sense 
only if the statement and account clause should be read not to permit a member of the body politic—
whether a federal taxpayer, a voter, or a citizen—to require, through judicial process, the production 
of the CIA’s secret accounts.” (footnote omitted)). 
193 Id. at 232 (acknowledging that “nature and degree of injury are critical issues in deciding 
whether to provide legal protection”). 
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Conversely, the absence of a judicially cognizable injury should often signal 
that no constitutional violation has occurred. 
III. APPLYING A TIERED-SCRUTINY FRAMEWORK ACROSS DIVERSE 
CATEGORIES OF CASES 
The burden of this Part is to demonstrate that the analytically sequenced, 
tiered-scrutiny framework that I advocated in Part II would clarify 
substantive issues and improve analysis in the categories of Establishment 
Clause cases that Parts I and II outlined. My argument in this Part follows a 
category-by-category approach, with careful attention to the varieties of cases 
that arise within each. 
Admittedly, the categories that structure my analysis partly overlap. Every 
case involving financial support or accommodation for religion could also be 
categorized as involving symbolic support: when the government provides 
financial support, it signals its solicitude for religious institutions or 
practitioners.194 Nevertheless, paradigmatic cases within the various categories 
present sufficiently distinctive issues to merit separate discussion.195 Nor should 
overlap lead to confusion. Constitutionally protected rights and interests are as 
familiarly overlapping as they are diverse.196 With regard to any challenged law 
or practice that might occupy multiple categories, we can always ask first whether 
it violates constitutional tests applicable to financial support for or 
accommodation of religion. If not, we can then ask, residually, whether forbidden 
symbolic support for religion has occurred. 
 
194 But see Andrew Koppelman, And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American 
Law, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1115, 1121 (2013) (arguing that “the state can abstain from endorsing any 
specification of the best or truest religion while treating religion as such, understood very abstractly, 
as valuable” and thus “can accommodate religion as such while remaining religiously neutral”); 
Laycock, supra note 156, at 1796 (finding “virtually no evidence” at the time of the Founding “that 
anyone thought [religious accommodations] were constitutionally prohibited or that they were part 
of an establishment of religion”). 
195 Questions can also arise regarding possible overlap between the first two categories. For 
example, one can dispute whether tax exemptions for religious institutions fall into the category of 
financial support or that of accommodations. I argue below that the concept of accommodation 
properly applies only to the lifting of regulatory burdens that specifically forbid or penalize 
religiously required conduct or mandate religiously forbidden conduct. See infra notes 254–61. 
196 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (discussing the “interlocking 
nature” of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) 
(“Although [the Religion Clauses] may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different 
kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom.”). 
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A. Cases Involving Financial Aid to Religion 
In cases involving nonincidental financial expenditures that benefit 
churches or religious institutions,197 we need not tarry over the stage-one 
inquiry into whether challenged statutes or programs come within the 
Establishment Clause’s coverage and thus trigger some form of elevated 
judicial scrutiny. In light of the general, background right of citizens not to 
be taxed to support religion, the answer should be yes. 
At the second stage, when a level of scrutiny needs to be determined, it will 
prove helpful to distinguish cases involving provisions of benefits solely to 
religious institutions from cases involving distributions to religious and 
nonreligious institutions on a nondiscriminatory basis (as current doctrine does 
already). In light of the historical foundations of the Establishment Clause, a tax 
specifically levied for the support of a particular church would furnish the 
paradigm case of constitutional impermissibility. Within a strict scrutiny 
framework, it seems impossible to imagine any compelling governmental interest 
that such a tax and expenditure scheme would be necessary to promote.198 
Although no modern cases involve such blatant support for an 
establishment of religion, statutes that provide material benefits exclusively 
to religious entities remain close enough to the historically forbidden 
paradigm to merit strict scrutiny. Though the cases are few, they generally 
accord with this analysis and should be conceptualized as implicitly reflecting 
it. Perhaps the closest modern decision is Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,199 
which struck down sales tax exemptions for religious periodicals alone. The 
so-called “parsonage exemption” from the federal income tax, which allows 
clergy not to count the provision of a house or a housing allowance as taxable 
income, should also be tested under, and should fail, strict scrutiny.200 
Programs that distribute benefits to religious and nonreligious 
organizations on a formally neutral basis have understandably proved more 
 
197 Some government actions that are best thought of as symbolic support will inescapably involve 
incidental costs. If the symbolic support is constitutionally impermissible for reasons unrelated to taxation 
and financial support, any relevant action or practice should be invalidated for those reasons. 
198 It is characteristic of strict scrutiny regimes to leave open the question whether there are 
any extraordinary circumstances under which practices that are highly suspect might nevertheless 
be justified. See supra note 18. 
199 489 U.S. 1, 26 (1989). 
200 For discussion and citations to literature espousing competing viewpoints, see 
GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 295-96 & n.70. For now, I put aside questions of who would or 
should have standing to challenge the exemption. In doing so, I assume unapologetically that 
conscientious legislators should not enact or reenact legislation that they know to be 
unconstitutional, even if no one has standing to sue to challenge that legislation. See generally 
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1227-28 (1978) (arguing that judicially underenforced constitutional norms 
nevertheless impose obligations on nonjudicial actors). 
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vexing and have recurrently divided liberals from conservatives. Such statutes 
may have the effect of directing tax dollars into religious treasuries, but that 
is not their sole consequence, nor is it necessarily their aim. Statutes that 
distribute benefits to religious among other organizations are also familiar 
and diverse: churches typically benefit on a neutral basis from police and fire 
protection, street paving, snow removal, and a variety of other municipal 
services. Under constitutional provisions other than the Establishment 
Clause, the Supreme Court has often subjected statutes that have the 
incidental effect but not the transparent purpose of substantially infringing 
on constitutionally protected interests to elevated judicial tests, but ones less 
exacting than strict scrutiny.201 In the case of programs that provide tax-
supported material benefits to religious and nonreligious entities on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, I would suggest the intermediate scrutiny formula 
first articulated in Craig v. Boren.202 Under it, a statute will survive review if 
it is substantially related to an important governmental interest.203 
In controversial cases that have divided the Supreme Court, this form of 
intermediate scrutiny would clarify central issues, not least by distinguishing 
the questions of whether the government has important interests in providing 
benefits to religious as well as secular organizations and of whether challenged 
policies are sufficiently closely tailored to those interests. Consider, for 
example, the programs in Mitchell and Zelman. The one in Mitchell promoted 
an important governmental interest in ensuring effective education of 
children who attend private, including parochial, as well as public schools. 
Similarly, the voucher regime in Zelman contributed to the provision of 
individual choice among diverse opportunities for effective education, also an 
important governmental interest.204 
Nevertheless, when we come, separately, to the “substantial relationship” 
inquiry, courts should insist that governmental expenditures further secular 
interests without gratuitously supporting religious activities, such as 
expressly religious teaching. In light of this consideration, Justices O’Connor 
and Breyer—who concurred in the judgment in Mitchell but did not join 
Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion—rightly insisted that government 
 
201 See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 
(1996). Examples include incidental burdens on freedom of speech, see United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968), freedom of association, see Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign 
Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 93-94 (1982), and on the right to vote, see Crawford v. Marion Cty. 
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-91 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
202 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
203 Id. at 197. 
204 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983) (“[A] State’s efforts to assist parents in meeting 
the rising cost of educational expenses plainly serve[] [the] secular purpose of ensuring that the state’s 
citizenry is well-educated” and lift a burden on “public schools . . . to the benefit of all taxpayers.”). 
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resources that are provided directly to religious institutions should not be 
diverted for use in teaching religious dogma.205 In this respect, current 
doctrine is correct, and a tiered-scrutiny approach explains why: a program that 
allowed such diversion would not be sufficiently substantially related to the 
government’s justifying interest in providing effective secular education. By 
contrast, provision of police and fire protection to churches on a 
nondiscriminatory basis is substantially related to important governmental 
interests in avoiding crime and conflagration. That fit extends to specifically 
religious places and activities, even if some taxpayers would rather see churches 
vandalized or burned to the ground than fund provision for their aid. 
Voucher cases such as Zelman raise slightly different questions. On the 
surface, the facilitation of private choice among effective educational 
opportunities may constitute an important governmental interest in its own 
right, partly independent of the interest in ensuring effective education to all 
children. If so, a voucher program will look substantially related to the 
interest in enabling private choice. Nevertheless, at least two questions may 
arise within an intermediate scrutiny framework. 
The first is whether a program should fail the substantial tailoring 
requirement if a disproportionate number of beneficiaries enroll either in 
religious schools generally or in the schools of a particular denomination. 
Absent deliberate skews in administration, I would find intermediate scrutiny’s 
tailoring requirement to be satisfied if a program straightforwardly promotes 
educational diversity and private choice. Religion Clause jurisprudence once 
pursued a more multifactored approach in appraising governmental support for 
education in parochial schools and fell into near unintelligibility.206 
Vouchers and similar aid to individuals can also present a second question, 
involving whether the requirement of “substantially” close tailoring entails a 
limitation of government subsidies to the dollar value of the secular benefits 
that a program provides.207 In practice, most school voucher programs 
probably fund less than the full costs of a private-school education. But the 
question of an adequate secular return on governmental dollars expended 
arose in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, which upheld 
a vocational scholarship program that provided tuition aid to a blind student 
 
205 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
206 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 404 (noting that “[o]pinions of dissenting justices 
and scholarly writings have expressed dismay over the arbitrariness of distinctions between what the 
Court upheld and what it struck down” in school aid cases during the 1970s and early 1980s). 
207 See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAL. L. REV. 
260, 265-66 (1968) (“[M]y proposal is that government financial aid may be extended directly or 
indirectly to support parochial schools without violation of the establishment clause so long as such 
aid does not exceed the value of the secular educational service rendered by the school.”). 
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studying at a religious institution to become a pastor.208 Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills School District, which rejected a challenge to a funding program that 
permitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children in religious 
schools, presented a similar issue.209 These cases seem to me to have been 
rightly decided based on the government interests involved. The funding in 
Witters was substantially related to an important interest in providing 
adequate assistance to blind students to pursue post-secondary education in 
the fields and schools of their choice, on a basis that was not overtly hostile 
to religion. A similar analysis should apply to cases involving veterans who 
used the G.I. Bill to pursue religious education.210 Zobrest also seems to me to 
involve a substantial government interest that goes beyond furnishing basic 
secular education—one in providing deaf students with life opportunities 
comparable to those of young people who are not hearing-impaired. 
It is possible to imagine an ostensibly neutral scheme of voucher-type 
funding that is not substantially tailored to an important governmental interest 
in diversity or choice. A funding program might fail intermediate scrutiny if, 
for example, a state or local government shut down its public schools or so 
drastically underfunded them that it left parents with no practical choice but to 
cash their vouchers at parochial schools. If so, intermediate judicial scrutiny 
would better define the proper inquiry than the multifarious tests that judicial 
liberals have proposed and that conservatives have eschewed. 
I would similarly analyze programs under which governments provide 
voucher-based funding for social services other than education.211 The hardest 
cases involve situations in which religion is integral to the way in which a 
service provider performs its mission—of treating drug or alcohol dependency, 
for example.212 But in these cases as in those involving educational vouchers, 
we need to consider whether the government has a substantial interest in 
enabling private choice from among a menu of service providers. Often, I 
believe, the answer should be yes, as it frequently is under current law. In cases 
in which the funding occurs through vouchers, the reasoning that underlies 
Witters (and some uses of the G.I. Bill) should control. 
 
208 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
209 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
210 See GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 408. 
211 This, roughly, was the approach of Bowen v. Kendrick, which involved federal aid for 
“educational services relating to family life and problems associated with adolescent premarital 
sexual relations.” 487 U.S. 589, 594 (1988) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z–1(a)(4) (1984)). Rejecting a 
facial challenge, the Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether 
the statute was being improperly administered in ways that would include expenditures of money 
expressly to promote religion. Id. at 620-21. 
212 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 378. 
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Contracting schemes under which the government directly funds 
religiously affiliated service providers, such as programs to combat drug and 
alcohol dependency, raise distinctive issues. On their faces, they seem less 
closely tailored to facilitating private choice than voucher schemes. Under these 
circumstances, the government should, at a minimum, bear a burden of showing 
that “there are alternative secular providers of comparable quality available for 
any citizen who objects to receiving services in a religious setting.”213 
Tax exemptions pose yet further problems that a tiered-scrutiny 
framework would also help to illuminate. As I have indicated, exemptions 
exclusively for religious believers should elicit strict scrutiny that they almost 
certainly could not survive.214 But the Supreme Court rightly noticed the 
distinction between specifically targeted and more broadly based schemes of 
exemption in Walz v. Tax Commission,215 which upheld an exemption for “real 
or personal property used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable 
purposes.”216 Although the challenged statute required a classificatory 
distinction between religious and nonreligious entities, when religious 
organizations share their exemptions with a wide range of other charitable 
institutions, there is a significant analogy to other cases in which material 
benefits are distributed to religious and secular institutions on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. Accordingly, and contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
intimations in Walz, the most plausible justification for tax exemptions and 
deductions that benefit churches would be that religious institutions, like a 
variety of other nonprofit organizations, provide benefits that are cognizable 
in secular terms.217 For this rationale to apply, the government should need to 
afford comparable exemptions to some range of other nonprofit 
organizations, though not necessarily to all.218 
 
213 Cole, supra note 158, at 595-96. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: 
A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 583 
(2002) (emphasizing diversity and complexity in appraising government programs). Douglas 
Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel raise the related issue that “[c]oncerns with complicity may lead not only 
to the refusal to provide goods or services, but also to the refusal to provide information that would 
lead the patient to obtain those goods or services elsewhere,” with the result that patients are 
effectively “denied the opportunity to seek services from an alternative provider.” Conscience Wars: 
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2569-74 (2015). 
214 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
215 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970). 
216 Id. at 666-67 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1). 
217 Although the Court took note of this characteristic function of churches, id. at 673 (“The 
State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in 
community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest.”), only Justice 
Brennan relied on it. Id. at 687-89 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
218 It should not, however, need to engage in monitoring to determine whether particular 
churches advance these ends—an approach that would lead to an unhealthy entanglement between 
the state and religion. Cf. id. at 674 (majority opinion) (“To give emphasis to so variable an aspect 
of the work of religious bodies would introduce an element of governmental evaluation and 
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It is also arguable that tax exemptions for churches, even if exclusive to 
churches, might be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest 
in lifting burdens that impede the free exercise of religion. I shall discuss the 
possibly compelling governmental interest in accommodating free exercise 
below.219 But tax exemptions exclusively for churches would differ from other 
burden-lifting statutes because of their distinctive similarity to the 
historically forbidden paradigm of taxes exclusively to support religion. 
Cases involving government expenditures to pay chaplains present 
additional complications.220 Military chaplains raise one set of issues. The 
government’s administration of the military is distinctive in many respects, 
including under the Religion Clauses.221 When the government removes 
people from the opportunities that they otherwise would have for religious 
worship for periods of more than relatively brief duration, it acquires an 
important interest in responding to and satisfying felt needs and preferences, 
including religious preferences, that people who are so removed could not 
satisfy otherwise.222 Absent denominational favoritism, provision for military 
chaplains should therefore survive a form of intermediate scrutiny, crafted to 
the distinctive needs of the military. 
Paid legislative chaplains occupy a different category. If the issue were one 
of first impression, I would conclude that expenditures to pay legislative 
chaplains violate the Establishment Clause, historical practice 
notwithstanding. The payment of legislative chaplains is not narrowly 
tailored to a compelling interest or even substantially related to an important 
secular interest. But the Supreme Court upheld the payment of legislative 
chaplains, by a 6-3 vote, in Marsh v. Chambers.223 With Marsh now having 
been decided, and in light of the support that historical practice provides for 
 
standards as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of continuing 
day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.”). 
219 See infra notes 236–261 and accompanying text. 
220 The leading Supreme Court case on chaplains is Marsh v. Chambers, which upheld payment 
of legislative chaplains. 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983). The Second Circuit similarly upheld the practice of 
maintaining Army chaplains. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985). For valuable discussion of 
employment of military chaplains, including historical overviews and policy recommendations, see 
GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 207-20; and Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of 
Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 126-31 (2007). 
Although these authors conclude that military chaplaincies are constitutionally permissible, they have 
reservations about specific features of the current program. The payment of prison chaplains has less 
of a historical pedigree and raises additional distinctive issues. See GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 219-
20. 
221 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504, 510 (1986) (holding that the First 
Amendment did not prohibit an Air Force regulation that prevented service members from wearing 
yarmulkes while on duty and in uniform). 
222 See GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 208 (“The crucial premise in a defense of army 
chaplains is that the military withdraws soldiers and sailors from ordinary life.”). 
223 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983). 
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its conclusion,224 it seems to me a close question whether stare decisis should 
now control. Even if so, in the absence of any significant secular justification 
for paying legislative chaplains, it is hard to rationalize the non-neutral 
expenditures to promote religion that paying chaplains from government 
coffers entails.225 Accordingly, even if Marsh stands on its facts, the Court 
should not accord that precedent any further, generative significance.226 
B. Cases Involving Accommodation 
The paradigmatic cases of governmental accommodation of religion that 
Section I.B discussed all require classification based on religion for the purpose 
of granting religious exemptions or preferences. In Amos, the Court held that 
while “laws discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny . . . laws 
‘affording a uniform benefit to all religions’” should not be, if they are otherwise 
acceptable under Lemon.227 As I have emphasized, however, religiously-based 
classification and discrimination are highly dangerous,228 as is reflected in cases 
grouping religion-based classifications with race-based classifications under the 
Equal Protection Clause.229 Under the Establishment Clause as under other 
constitutional provisions, a strict scrutiny framework would systematize an 
appropriately wary judicial analysis. 
Although all religious classifications should trigger strict scrutiny, 
religiously-based exemptions from otherwise applicable regulatory duties and 
prohibitions should sometimes (although surely not always) survive that test. 
An analogy comes from the approach that the Supreme Court has adopted in 
scrutinizing race-based affirmative action under the Equal Protection 
Clause.230 The Court regards race-based classification as suspect, even when 
 
224 Id. at 786-90. 
225 See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1049 (2010) (arguing that “legislative prayer requires the government to 
make” religious choices, each of which “marginalizes the religious segment that disagrees with it” 
and “furthers religious division”). 
226 This seems to be roughly the approach of Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway. 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1841-42 (2014) (“The practice at issue here differs from the one 
sustained in Marsh because Greece’s town meetings involve participation by ordinary citizens, and 
the invocations given—directly to those citizens—were predominantly sectarian in content. Still 
more, Greece’s Board did nothing to recognize religious diversity.”). 
227 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982)). 
228 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 158, at 577 (“Religious division is renowned throughout history, 
from the Crusades to the Spanish Inquisition.”). 
229 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
230 Just as one might think that preferences for racial minorities in university admissions 
should be viewed as less suspect than policies of race-based exclusion, one might conclude that 
accommodation statutes merit different analysis from laws that affirmatively exclude religious 
minorities from benefits or opportunities. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes 
About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 67-68 (1996) (“When whites act to the detriment of African 
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implemented for non-invidious purposes, but not as categorically forbidden 
in light of compelling governmental interests.231 
The government’s compelling interest in creating religiously-based 
exemptions from otherwise applicable obligations and prohibitions derives 
from the Free Exercise Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith,232 the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause exceedingly narrowly. 
A number of prior cases had found that the Clause requires exemptions from 
otherwise applicable statutory mandates that interfere with religious duties, 
absent proof by the government that across-the-board enforcement is 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.233 Rejecting that 
approach, Smith ruled that the Free Exercise Clause does not require 
exemptions from generally applicable legal obligations.234 As construed in 
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause provides judicially enforceable protection 
only against statutes that single out religiously motivated conduct for 
disfavored treatment.235 
Smith’s narrow framing of the Free Exercise Clause’s protective reach does 
not define the outer limit of the government’s compelling interest in 
accommodating religious practice. Much of the analysis in Smith depends on 
the practical incapacity of the judiciary to develop a scheme of ad hoc 
 
Americans, there is good reason for stepped-up judicial review. But when a majority acts to lift a 
burden on a minority, regardless of the justification, there is no good reason for stepped-up judicial 
review.”); Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and 
Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 119, 179 (1997) (discussing the role of affirmative action and legislative 
accommodations as “validat[ing] and affirm[ing] the importance and value of [an] individual’s sense 
of self as equal to that of the majority members”). More in the case of religious preferences than of 
race-based affirmative action, however, I think that any differences are best accounted for within a 
strict scrutiny framework. 
231 See supra note 18. 
232 494 U.S. 872, 882, 888-90 (1990). 
233 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141, 146 (1987); Thomas 
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221, 235-36 (1972); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-09 (1963). 
234 494 U.S. at 878-79. 
235 After Smith, the Court found such intentional singling out in a city ordinance banning 
animal sacrifice that targeted practitioners of Santería in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993). In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC, the Court unanimously distinguished Smith and found that the First Amendment required 
a “ministerial exception” to otherwise generally applicable prohibitions against employment 
discrimination. 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-07 (2012). In contrast with the statute in Smith, which “involved 
governmental regulation of only outward physical acts,” the antidiscrimination statute threatened 
“government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the 
church itself.” Id. at 707. For discussion of the relationship between Smith and Hosanna-Tabor and of 
the many questions that the latter left open, see Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-
Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012). 
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exemptions to generally applicable laws.236 If based substantially on the 
practical difficulties of judicial enforcement, Smith converts the Free Exercise 
Clause into a “judicially underenforced constitutional norm[].”237 When 
Smith is so read, it should follow that Congress and the state legislatures have 
important and even compelling interests in affording greater protection to 
free exercise values than Smith mandates.238 
If analysis of statutes that provide exceptions for religious objectors 
proceeded pursuant to the strict scrutiny formula, and if the government has 
a compelling interest in lifting burdens on the free exercise of religion, the 
question of narrow tailoring would prove crucial. In cases under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has treated the narrow tailoring 
inquiry as subsuming questions involving acceptable burdens on third 
parties.239 It should do likewise under the Establishment Clause.240 
Professors Lupu and Tuttle, among others, question why any third-party 
burden should be acceptable.241 As they point out, accommodations that 
benefit religious objectors but impose burdens on third parties bear 
similarities to forbidden taxes exclusively to support religion. In that context, 
they maintain, any tax burden, no matter how trifling, would result in 
unconstitutionality. Although that conclusion is likely correct in any 
practically imaginable instance, a strict scrutiny framework asks us to rethink 
the grounds on which the judgment that a tax would be impermissible rests. 
Under strict scrutiny, we would need to ask whether the government has a 
 
236 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89 (observing that a rule requiring judges to recognize 
exemptions to generally applicable laws would “court[] anarchy”). 
237 See Sager, supra note 200 at 1227 (distinguishing between fully enforced and underenforced 
constitutional norms). Douglas Laycock and Luke W. Goodrich also find judicial underenforcement 
of statutory mandates for religious exemptions, based on the belief of some courts, “as a matter of 
institutional competence,” that “judges should not be in the business of drawing a line between 
religious accommodations and government interests.” RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-
Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1021, 1053 (2012). 
238 Cf. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 
1469 (1999) (proposing a “common-law exemption model” that would “let courts decide in the first 
instance whether an exemption is to be granted” but allow legislative revision of the courts’ decisions). 
239 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978) (opinion of Powell, 
J.) (discussing burdens on third-party applicants as part of the tailoring analysis). 
240 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (recognizing, albeit not as an aspect 
of a narrow tailoring inquiry, that religious exemptions must “take adequate account of the burdens 
. . . impose[d] on nonbeneficiaries”). 
241 See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 169, at 232-36. Frederick Mark Gedicks and 
Rebecca G. Van Tassell argue that “the Establishment Clause precludes permissive accommodations 
that shift the material costs of practicing a religion from the accommodated believers to those who 
believe and practice differently,” because “forcing those who do not belong to a religion to bear the 
material costs of practicing it is functionally equivalent to taxing nonadherents to support the 
accommodated faith.” See RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional 
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 343, 362-63 (2014). 
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compelling interest in imposing a tax for the distinctive benefit of churches. 
Virtually without exception, the answer will be no. Whether a statute that 
lifts governmentally imposed burdens on religious institutions and practices 
is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in alleviating direct burdens on 
the free exercise of religion is a different question. 
In considering narrow tailoring and the permissibility of third-party 
burdens, it may help to have concrete examples in view. One involves 
Congress’s provision, via the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), of 
exemptions from the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) mandate to employers to 
provide their employees with health insurance coverage that includes 
contraception.242 Under RFRA, the government must exempt religious 
objectors whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by a regulation 
unless it can demonstrate that refusing an exemption is “the least restrictive” 
means of promoting a “compelling” interest.243 Another currently debated 
issue arises from state statutes that exempt religious objectors from state-law 
antidiscrimination rules, including provisions that otherwise would require 
service providers to furnish services for same-sex marriage celebrations.244 
 
242 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 241, at 350 (noting that the ACA mandate provides 
an example of cost shifting to nonadherents). 
243 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), 
held that some for-profit corporations can qualify as “persons” entitled to religious exemptions 
under RFRA. The scope of required accommodations remained in doubt, however, after Zubik v. 
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), vacated and remanded a court of appeals’ decision without squarely 
resolving disputed issues. On October 6, 2017, the Trump Administration issued interim final rules 
allowing employers to decline to provide contraception coverage based on either a religious or a 
moral objection. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (concerning religious 
exemptions); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 
54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (moral exemptions). Various parties immediately filed 
suit to challenge the validity of the new regulations under the Establishment Clause as well as the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection mandate. See Robert 
Pear et al., Trump Administration Rolls Back Birth Control Mandate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trump-contraception-birth-control.html 
[https://perma.cc/UJY2-JB6Q] (describing lawsuits by Massachusetts and California); see also Ema 
O’Connor, The Trump Administration is Already Facing Several Lawsuits over its New Birth Control 
Rules, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/emaoconnor/four-groups-have-
already-said-theyll-sue-the-trump [https://perma.cc/G7E4-LZEA] (describing additional lawsuits 
by Washington, Pennsylvania, the ACLU, the Center for Reproductive Rights, and others). 
244 See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective, in THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 285-89, 303-04 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, and Zoë 
Robinson eds., 2016) (discussing such claims by religiously objecting photographers and florists); 
Andrew Koppelman, A Zombie in the Supreme Court: The Elane Photography Cert Denial, 
7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 77, 78-79 (2015) (discussing a case involving potential conflict between 
religious liberty and gay rights). 
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In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, the Court upheld an exemption from Title VII’s 
antidiscrimination requirements that resulted in an employee losing his 
job.245 Amos, however, possesses only limited relevance to most questions 
arising under RFRA and parallel state statutes. Amos involved a compelling 
interest in avoiding governmental interference in the religion-based choices 
made by religious organizations in the conduct of nonprofit, religiously 
inflected activities.246 In Amos, the religiously inflected nature of the 
discharged employee’s work as a janitor might reasonably be questioned. But 
if we credit the government’s interest in being able to draw a clean line that 
groups all employees of religious organizations’ nonprofit affiliates into a 
single category, then imposing the loss of a job on a third party may 
reasonably count as narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in avoiding 
interference with the internal structure and operations of churches and 
closely affiliated charitable institutions.247 By contrast, the demand for narrow 
tailoring appropriately bites more sharply when the government asks one 
citizen to suffer a burden in order to facilitate another citizen’s personal 
religious practice. Consistent with this distinction, the Court held in Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor,248 and more recently reaffirmed in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
that excessively large burdens on third parties can result in constitutional 
invalidity under the Establishment Clause.249 
 
245 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). 
246 Id. at 335-36. Douglas NeJaime catalogues state antidiscrimination laws that “permit 
religious employers to use religion as a factor in employment, but . . . limit the use of religion to 
employment positions that concern the religious purpose of the organization.” Marriage Inequality: 
Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 
100 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1193 (2012). 
247 The Supreme Court more recently identified a constitutional imperative of non-
interference in some aspects of the internal structure of religious organizations in Hosanna-Tabor. 
See supra text accompanying note 235. 
248 472 U.S. 703, 708-09 (1985). 
249 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). Although I have emphasized the need for the government to 
justify religious exemptions as necessary to promote a compelling interest under the Establishment 
Clause, RFRA appears on the surface to reverse the compelling-interest inquiry: it provides 
exemptions for religious objectors unless the government can demonstrate a compelling interest in 
denying an exemption. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (2012) (requiring “the least restrictive” means 
of promoting a “compelling” interest). Against the background of Establishment Clause concerns 
that religious exemptions should not impose excessive burdens on non-beneficiaries, however, the 
statute’s denial of religious exemptions pursuant to a compelling-interest test serves a 
constitutionally necessary function. Whether or not Congress so intended, we should view the 
government as having a compelling interest in avoiding the imposition of constitutionally excessive 
burdens on third parties. In other words, courts should conduct RFRA-based analysis into whether 
denying exemptions to religious objectors is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest 
in a way that ensures that RFRA does not overstep the bounds of constitutional permissibility, and 
violate the Establishment Clause, by imposing unreasonably large burdens on third parties in its 
application to particular cases. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, 
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Although tiered scrutiny and the distinction between compelling-interest 
and narrow-tailoring inquiries would importantly advance analysis of 
acceptable third-party burdens, any ultimate resolution of the contested 
issues requires normative judgment. For my own part, I would reject the view 
that no burdens are permissible, or even that no burden may be more than 
“de minimis.”250 In particular, I would conclude that the burdens imposed by 
exemptions from otherwise applicable state antidiscrimination laws are not 
unreasonable, and are therefore constitutionally acceptable, when alternative 
providers of services or opportunities are readily available. Exemptions from 
antidiscrimination mandates can undoubtedly carry negative expressive 
connotations and empower stigmatization along lines of historic oppression 
and continuing dignitary vulnerability—for example, when photographers or 
caterers claim religious exemptions from obligations to provide services in 
connection with same-sex weddings.251 I do not mean to trivialize the 
significance of such actions. But I would hesitate to conclude that any 
cognizable burden on third-party interests disables the legislature from 
creating new rights—for example, to health care coverage or to non-
discrimination by private providers of services—and, at the same time, 
making accommodations to alleviate burdens on freedom of religious 
exercise.252 Accordingly, while I would deem categorical exemptions 
impermissible, I would uphold exemptions where alternative services or 
opportunities are reasonably available.253 
 
and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1383 (2016) (“Accommodations 
required by RFRA by definition will not violate the Establishment Clause, because any religious 
accommodation that would violate the Establishment Clause will not be required by RFRA in the 
first place.”). But see Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 241, at 363, 373 (arguing that any “significant” 
or “substantial” burden would violate the Establishment Clause and that RFRA is therefore 
vulnerable to as-applied challenges). 
250 In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison the Supreme Court construed the Title VII mandate 
that employers provide “reasonable accommodation” of their employees’ religious beliefs as not 
requiring them to bear more than “de minimis cost.” 432 U.S. 63, 81, 84 (1977). 
251 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of LGBT Rights, 
7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. REV. 1, 67 (2015) (noting the political symbolism of a “license to discriminate.”). 
252 Compare Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, 
Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1429 (2012) 
(arguing that religious exemptions are in the interest of all sides in debates on contentious social 
issues including same-sex marriage and contraception), with Shannon Gilreath, Not A Moral Issue: 
Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 206 (2010) (book review) 
(rejecting purported compromises as insufficiently respectful of the countervailing third-party 
interests at stake). Andrew Koppelman argues for a middle position under which religiously owned 
“[b]usinesses that serve the public, such as wedding photographers, should be exempted” from 
antidiscrimination laws, “but only if they are willing to bear the cost of publicly identifying 
themselves as discriminatory.” Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 620 (2015). 
253 Cf. Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, How Much May Religious 
Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2017) 
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So far I have suggested that the government has a compelling interest in 
lifting governmentally imposed burdens on religiously motivated conduct. 
Sometimes, however, the term “accommodation” is used more broadly. 
Perhaps most importantly, state and federal statutes sometimes require 
private parties to accommodate the religious beliefs of their employees or 
clientele. To take the most prominent example, Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act requires private employers to provide reasonable accommodations 
of the religious practices of employees unless doing so would impose undue 
hardship.254 The state of Connecticut established a more stringent 
accommodation requirement through the statute that the Supreme Court 
invalidated in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor.255 Although I have referred to cases 
arising under such statutes in discussing when burdens on third parties violate 
the Establishment Clause, federal statutes that mandate accommodations by 
private firms—centrally including Title VII—raise a threshold issue of 
congressional authority that statutes lifting federally imposed burdens do not. 
Here, a tiered-scrutiny regime usefully presses us to consider exactly what 
the government’s interest in mandating private accommodations is and how 
weighty it should be adjudged. As a general matter, the government has no 
legitimate, much less a compelling, interest in directing private entities to treat 
religious believers more generously than they treat others. The mandate of the 
Free Exercise Clause does not extend to non-governmental actors. Accordingly, 
the Court cannot derive a compelling interest in forcing private parties to grant 
religious exemptions from a judicially underenforced Free Exercise Clause. If 
not, the question becomes whether the government has another, compelling 
interest in requiring private actors to bear the costs of burdensome religious 
accommodations that necessarily employ religion-based classifications. 
With this question clearly framed, the foundation for permissible 
governmental mandates of private accommodation that require religion-based 
classification must lie in the first instance in equality-based or antidiscrimination 
norms.256 Unfortunately, the line between prohibitions against religious 
 
(arguing for the adoption of Title VII’s “undue hardship” standard to weigh the permissibility of 
burdens on third parties). 
254 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012). 
255 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985) (invalidating a Connecticut mandate “that those who observe a 
Sabbath any day of the week as a matter of religious conviction must be relieved of the duty to work on 
that day, no matter what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the employer or fellow workers”). 
256 See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 386-87 (characterizing Title VII and similar federal 
accommodation mandates as “prohibiting religious discrimination” and as “being pro-religious 
freedom, which the Establishment Clause permits, as distinct from being pro-religion, which the 
clause disallows”); cf. Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 81 (“The repeated, unequivocal emphasis of 
both the language and the legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in 
employment . . . . It would be anomalous to conclude that by ‘reasonable accommodation’ Congress 
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discrimination, on the one hand, and mandated accommodations of religious 
beliefs and practices, on the other, can frequently prove elusive.257 Among other 
things, most employers’ pre-existing work rules will likely reflect the 
assumptions, values, or preferences of those with relatively mainstream 
religious practices. Accordingly, although accommodation mandates that 
require explicitly religion-based classification should trigger strict scrutiny, I 
believe that some such mandates advance a compelling government interest, 
which Justice O’Connor once characterized as “assuring employment 
opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society.”258 Moreover, statutes 
(such as Title VII) that require only reasonable accommodations and thereby 
limit the burdens that they impose on third parties should satisfy strict 
scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement. 
Proponents of other kinds of statutes and policies that benefit religion 
sometimes also claim the mantle of “accommodation.”259 A familiar example 
involves prayers on public occasions: supporters sometimes defend them as 
accommodations for people who want to pray.260 This argument attempts to 
press the concept of accommodation, as it currently figures in Establishment 
Clause doctrine, too far. Cutter v. Wilkinson appropriately took care to limit 
its analysis to cases involving the lifting or relaxation of regulations or 
requirements—especially those that the government imposes directly.261 
C. Symbolic Support Cases 
In thinking about symbolic support cases, we should begin at stage one 
of a scheme of sequenced, tiered scrutiny by asking which policies, 
statutes, and activities sufficiently impinge on interests that the 
Establishment Clause protects to call for any form of elevated scrutiny. I 
foreshadowed my own conclusions in Section II.A. There I described 
modern doctrine as recognizing a right not to be symbolically demeaned 
or marginalized by governmental endorsement of religion, and not to be 
coerced into participating in a religious exercise. But Section II.A did not 
 
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees, as well as deprive 
them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others.”). 
257 See generally Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 
645 (2001) (arguing that “some aspects of antidiscrimination law . . . are in fact requirements of 
accommodation” and that other aspects of antidiscrimination law are more similar to accommodation 
mandates than is generally acknowledged). 
258 Caldor, 472 U.S. at 712 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
259 See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 336-51 (discussing the limits of the concept of 
accommodation). 
260 See, e.g., County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-61 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that a public display of a crèche and a menorah 
during holiday season constituted a recognition or accommodation of citizens’ religious beliefs). 
261 544 U.S. 709, 720-24 (2005). 
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identify any more general, freestanding right or interest in having the 
government maintain strict neutrality (in any plausible sense of that term) 
in expression regarding religion. 
If it were left to me to write a Constitution and then develop doctrine to 
implement it, I would insist on broader safeguards against symbolic 
governmental support for religion than exist under the Constitution and 
implementing doctrine that we now have. But I have no such prerogative. In light 
of historical practice, including longstanding judicial failure to uproot many 
instances of symbolic support for religion, some of which trace nearly to the 
nation’s founding, we should acknowledge that symbolic expressions such as “In 
God We Trust” on the currency and declarations of national days of prayer and 
Thanksgiving do not violate any judicially cognizable individual rights. 
When entrenched practices are morally odious—as, for example, were 
those at issue in Brown v. Board of Education,262 which mandated an end to 
racial discrimination in the public schools, and Loving v. Virginia,263 which 
invalidated state antimiscegenation law—long history should not prevent 
their rejection by the courts. Moral judgment is therefore inescapable in 
Establishment Clause cases on roughly the same terms as under other 
constitutional provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause.264 Looking 
backward, I believe that the effect of school prayer and Bible-reading in 
marking non-Christians and even some Christians, including Catholics, as 
disfavored outsiders justified the Court’s decisions invalidating those 
practices in Engel v. Vitale265 and School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp,266 especially in light of accreting foundations for those decisions in 
judicial precedent. 
But “mild endorsements” 267 outside the context of the public schools do 
not, in my judgment, raise issues of comparable moral and constitutional 
urgency. Taking the acceptability of such endorsements as settled by history, 
yet seeking to define and rationalize the limits that modern doctrine has 
imposed, I would urge a threshold test under which symbolic governmental 
support for religion provokes no special demand for justification under the 
Establishment Clause unless a law, practice, or display has significant, 
modern-day effects in promoting religion or stigmatizing religious outsiders. 
 
262 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”). 
263 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a 
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”). 
264 See generally David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An 
Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 945 (2008) (discussing when judges and Justices should accept 
the authority of precedents that they believe to have been wrongly decided in the first instance). 
265 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
266 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
267 See GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 101. 
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Admittedly, determining when legislation has significant effects in promoting 
religion or stigmatizing or demeaning religious minorities would pose 
delicate problems. But such problems appear unavoidable unless the Supreme 
Court is prepared either to invalidate all legislation that has the predominant 
purpose of promoting religion, at one extreme, or to approve all religion-
promoting legislation that is not overtly coercive, at the other.268 
Within the Supreme Court’s cases to date, the most sensitive effort to 
identify legally significant harms that result from the expressive impact of 
symbolic support for religion has come from the “objective observer” 
framework that Justice O’Connor developed. Justice O’Connor offered 
alternative formulations of her proposed test. The most apt, in my view, 
probes whether a challenged practice or statute conveys an implicit message 
disapproving some citizens’ beliefs and thus stigmatizing them as outsiders 
to the political community.269 In pursuing a similar but not identical inquiry, 
Professor Greenawalt points to “the inclusiveness of the view that is 
endorsed, historical pedigree, [and] the brevity of references to religion” as 
considerations that matter to judicial inquiry.270 In seeking to rationalize the 
main outlines of a body of doctrine that does not conform perfectly to 
anyone’s normative ideals, but that aims at compromise where I believe that 
compromise is vital, I, too, would take those considerations into account. 
Justice O’Connor’s objective observer test has drawn wide criticism as too 
subjective.271 This is an undoubted problem, which can be only partly 
alleviated by specifying that the relevant perspective is that of a reasonable 
 
268 Cf. County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Our cases disclose two limiting principles: 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it 
may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in 
such a degree that it in fact ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’” 
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984))). 
269 Id. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The question 
under endorsement analysis . . . is whether a reasonable observer would view” a challenged practice 
or statute as expressing “disapproval of his or her particular religious choices.”). As Justice O’Connor 
put it in Lynch, “Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents [of a favored religion] that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” 465 U.S. at 687-88. 
270 GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 101. 
271 See, e.g., County. of Allegheny, 492 at 675-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (arguing the test lends itself to a subjective inquiry); Jesse H. Choper, 
The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J. L. & POL. 499, 510-12 (2002) (discussing the 
lack of clarity provided by the court regarding the “Reasonable Observer” test); Steven D. Smith, 
Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 
86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 267 (1987) (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s “no endorsement” test would 
introduce more “ambiguities and analytical deficiencies” into the doctrine); see also KOPPELMAN, 
supra note 20, at 45-77 (criticizing the test but then advocating adoption of it in a “modified” form). 
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religious outsider.272 In weighing the proper legal conclusion, we should not 
question the good faith of those who claim to experience marginalization or 
stigmatization from the presence of “In God We Trust” on the currency, for 
example.273 The requisite judgments are legal, informed but not determined by 
psychological facts.274 For what it is worth, I would agree with most, but not all, 
of Justice O’Connor’s controversial judgments—for example, that holiday 
displays with religious components may frequently convey no religiously 
marginalizing message, but that standalone crèches typically would.275 
As Justice Scalia warned, predicating judicial analysis on disputable 
assessments of stigma and marginalization could imaginably “inflame 
religious passions by” inviting “endless litigation.”276 But a few guideposts 
should alleviate worries about uncertainty in many cases. If statutes’ 
expressive effects should instigate elevated judicial scrutiny when they 
substantially marginalize or stigmatize nonadherents to a favored creed, then 
a distinction between newly enacted and older statutes should often prove 
decisive.277 Overall, the Supreme Court has exhibited a greater toleration for 
long-ensconced practices that symbolically support religion—such as 
inscribing “In God We Trust” on the currency—than for newly initiated 
 
272 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1574 (2010) (calling for a “reasonable religious outsider’s perspective” in 
evaluating the constitutionality of ceremonial deism); Developments in the Law—Religion and the 
State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1648 (1987) (“If the establishment clause is to prohibit [the] 
government from sending the message to religious minorities or nonadherents that the state favors 
certain beliefs and that as nonadherents they are not fully members of the political community, its 
application must turn on the message received by the minority or nonadherent.”). 
273 Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 155, at 67 (arguing that “the children of atheists, agnostics, and 
Buddhists to name a few, are . . . overwhelmingly likely to think that” recitations of the Pledge of 
Allegiance mark them as “outsiders, not full members of the political community,” even though 
Justice O’Connor concluded otherwise). 
274 See B. Jessie Hill, Anatomy of the Reasonable Observer, 79 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1407, 
1409-10 (2014) (arguing that the reasonable observer framework does not “capture the way real 
people actually view a religious display” but instead should be understood as “an accurate 
model for making sense of the process of interpreting social meaning”). For a perceptive 
discussion of analogous issues under the Equal Protection Clause, see DEBORAH HELLMAN, 
WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 59-85 (2008). 
275 See County. of Allegheny, 492 at 624-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (concluding that “placement of the central religious symbol of the Christmas holiday 
season at the Allegheny County Courthouse has the unconstitutional effect of conveying a 
government endorsement of Christianity”). 
276 McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 908 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
277 Cf. Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations and 
Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211, 1251-52 (2011) (“Even a Court composed of 
nine aggressive secular liberals would not order the demolition or sandblasting of every religious symbol 
on any government property in America . . . . If the Court is determined to permit some longstanding 
religious displays to remain just because they have been there a long time, it would do better to 
announce a rule explicitly about time—a grandfather clause, a statute of limitations, or a laches bar—
rather than absurdly trying to secularize symbols that are plainly religious.”). 
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practices, such as the introduction of displays of the Ten Commandments in 
public buildings.278 In my view, the expressive effects of legislation in 
supporting religion or marginalizing religious minorities are frequently 
greater at the time of the legislature’s initial action than when original 
purposes are widely forgotten. The Court’s analysis in McGowan v. 
Maryland,279 which upheld the constitutionality of a set of Maryland statutes 
that barred many retail establishments from opening on Sunday, is instructive 
in this respect. The Court acknowledged that the legislature that originally 
enacted at least one of the challenged laws had a purpose, and presumably 
achieved the effect, of promoting religion.280 But the Court concluded that 
such provisions had a “present purpose and effect” that stood “wholly apart 
from their original purposes or connotations”—one of “provid[ing] a uniform 
day of rest for all citizens.”281 In other words, the challenged statutes had 
ceased to communicate a message that marked some citizens as outsiders to 
the community’s approved religious practices. 
Recognizing that the expressive effects of religion-supporting practices 
can diminish over time makes sense of the Court’s failure to require the 
chiseling out of religious symbols and exercises (such as “In God We Trust” 
on the currency and possibly legislative prayer) that it should not allow to be 
initiated today.282 I also think it fair to say—however harsh it will sound in 
some ears—that the reasonable observer that we can construct or reconstruct 
from the case law sometimes requires religious minorities or outsiders to 
accept or acclimatize themselves to practices that are now largely woven into 
the culture and that convey no fresh, marginalizing message delivered by 
modern political decisionmakers. I do not, however, exclude the possibility 
that the expressively stigmatizing effects of a statute might grow, rather than 
recede, over time.283 
 
278 See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005). 
279 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
280 See id. at 431 (“There is no dispute that the original laws which dealt with Sunday labor 
were motivated by religious forces. But what we must decide is whether present Sunday legislation, 
having undergone extensive changes from the earliest forms, still retains its religious character.”). 
281 Id. at 445. 
282 This, roughly, is what I take to be the approach of Justice Breyer’s controlling concurring 
opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Salute to Justice 
Breyer’s Concurring Opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 128 HARV. L. REV. 429, 431-33 (2014) (arguing 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence “suggests a narrow prescription that embodies pragmatic good sense”); 
see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (noting that some practices that “no longer have a religious purpose or meaning” might 
be “insulate[d]” from judicial scrutiny). 
283 A possible example may lie in school prayer. According to Michael J. Klarman, “Under the 
‘Protestant consensus’ that was dominant until at least the late nineteenth century—in many places 
much longer—public school displays of (Protestant) religiosity, such as prayer, Bible reading (from 
the King James, not the Douay, Bible), and religious hymn singing were unobjectionable on the 
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If a statute or policy—such as one of sectarian public prayer—has 
significant religiously marginalizing effects, then strict judicial scrutiny ought 
to apply. Once the threshold that triggers elevated scrutiny is crossed, the 
government has no substantial interest in facilitating religious exercise by, for 
example, organizing public prayers. Under these premises, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway to uphold a town government 
body’s practice of commencing its sessions with often-sectarian prayers seems 
to me to have been mistaken. The Court erred, first in failing to see the need 
for an elevated standard of judicial review and then in failing to invalidate a 
practice that could not possibly have satisfied strict scrutiny. 
D. Religion in the Public Schools 
In finding that the government violates the Establishment Clause by 
offering endorsements of religion within the public schools, the Supreme 
Court has not insisted on evidence of coercion (beyond the coercive pressure 
to attend public schools) or religious stigmatization. But if the Court 
renounces the position that a religious purpose can violate the Establishment 
Clause even in the absence of significant religious effects—as I have argued 
that it should—then it needs to formulate a threshold standard to signal the 
need for strict judicial scrutiny. Largely consistent with the case law to date, 
the operative question in cases challenging religious displays and practices in 
the public schools should be whether a reasonable observer would perceive 
governmental endorsement of religion.284 
So recognizing would call for a reconceptualization of some leading cases, 
but not necessarily for a change of result in many of them. If endorsement 
became the touchstone in cases involving religion in the public schools, 
statutes requiring school prayers would register as suspect, but provision for 
moments of silence ordinarily would not. In Wallace v. Jaffree, plaintiffs 
successfully challenged a statute authorizing a moment of silence “for 
meditation or voluntary prayer” that the Alabama legislature enacted to 
supplant a prior statute that already permitted schools to observe a daily 
 
ground that the United States was a ‘Christian nation.’” Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1996). Professor Klarman suggests that it was not until the societal 
changes wrought by mass immigration of religious minorities (Catholics and Jews in particular) that 
the popular “connot[ation]” of church-state separation changed to render these practices 
objectionable and oppressive. Id. at 47-49. 
284 Although a forbidden legislative intent should not constitute a per se Establishment Clause 
violation, evidence that the legislature acted with a forbidden intent could play an indirect role in 
constitutional analysis, as evidence that would inform a reasonable observer’s perception or non-
perception of a governmental endorsement of religion. Cf. Fallon, supra note 13, at 585 (noting that 
legislators’ known intentions can contribute to a statute’s expressive effects). 
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moment of silence “for meditation.”285 Under the circumstances, the second 
moment-of-silence statute conveyed a message of endorsement. 
In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute 
providing that if public school teachers taught evolution, they must also 
present the alternative theory of “creation science.”286 Justice Brennan’s Court 
opinion rested on the ground that the statute had a forbidden purpose of 
promoting religion.287 The Court should have asked instead whether the 
statute, as viewed through the eyes of an objective observer, conveyed a 
message of endorsement. Although that question seems to me to be an 
arguable one, I believe that the Court reached the correct result. 
If endorsement exists, then strict scrutiny should apply. We could still ask 
whether the endorsement is necessary to promote a compelling governmental 
interest. But it is hard to imagine cases in which endorsing religion in the 
public schools would satisfy that test. 
E. Concluding Methodological Note: The Establishment Clause in Context 
The views that I have expressed in this Part will frustrate many 
Establishment Clause conservatives and Establishment Clause liberals 
alike—and especially those who train their attention on the Establishment 
Clause in relative abstraction from the remainder of constitutional law. 
Before concluding this Part, I should offer a response. 
The proper judicial role under the Establishment Clause almost 
necessarily requires the integration of Religion Clause theory with more 
general constitutional theory. Many conservatives maintain that the Supreme 
Court should revamp Establishment Clause doctrine pursuant to 
predominantly if not exclusively originalist premises.288 As I have recognized, 
original meanings matter to constitutional law. But they should not matter 
more to the Establishment Clause than to federalism or separation-of-powers 
doctrine, the Free Speech Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause.289 Anyone 
 
285 472 U.S. 38, 58-59 (1985). 
286 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987). 
287 See id. at 594 (“Becuase the primary purpose of the Creationsim Act is to endorse a 
particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.”). 
288 See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence was built upon a “mistaken understanding of constitutional history”); 
see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (arguing prior Establishment Clause cases were wrongly decided because they 
departed from the original enacting intent of the Clause). 
289 See DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 12-18 (2010) (arguing that “if 
originalism were to prevail,” racially segregated public schooling would be permitted, the 
government could discriminate against women, “[t]he Bill of Rights would not apply to the states,” 
states could violate “one-person, one-vote” principles, and “[m]any federal labor, environmental, and 
consumer protection laws would be unconstitutional”). 
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who believes that the Court should set aside more than a half-century of 
precedent and the values that underlie it should have to explain why practice 
and precedent matter less in Establishment Clause than in other 
constitutional cases. Especially given the contestability of historical 
understandings,290 I see no adequate reason. 
My analysis and conclusions will also have disappointed, and possibly 
outraged, those liberals who advance a normative vision of the Establishment 
Clause that would forbid any material or symbolic support for religion 
whatsoever. My response and challenge to them partly track what I have said 
in response to those constitutional originalists who would accord no weight 
to longstanding practice and precedent. Yes, we can imagine the Supreme 
Court ordering the removal of “In God We Trust” from the currency and 
forbidding all religious displays in public places. But anyone disposed to 
demand the uprooting of these practices should also think carefully about how 
such a stance would relate to principles of stare decisis and judicial restraint 
that govern, or should govern, in the rest of constitutional law.291 If 
confronted with a partly analogous situation in which judicial conservatives 
prepared to overturn longstanding practices of congressional economic 
regulation under the Commerce Clause, most liberals would, I suspect, recoil 
with horror at what they would characterize as intolerable judicial activism. 
To summarize: As I have emphasized repeatedly in calling for a wide-angle 
appraisal of Establishment Clause doctrine, it is a deep if familiar mistake to 
argue about Establishment Clause issues in isolation from the remainder of 
constitutional law. Adaptation of the sequenced, tiered-scrutiny approach that 
has worked well elsewhere could produce significant, rationalizing 
improvements in Establishment Clause doctrine. At the same time, reformist 
impulses within the domain of the Establishment Clause should often yield to 
transdoctrinal principles of judicial caution and restraint. 
IV. STANDING TO SUE TO ENFORCE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
This Part examines, and proposes frameworks for resolving, currently 
controverted issues involving standing to enforce the Establishment Clause. A 
central, organizing insight involves the conceptual connection between the rights 
or interests that the Establishment Clause substantively protects and the interests 
any infringement of which should suffice to create standing. Accordingly, this 
Part draws heavily on subsection II.A.2’s analysis of substantive rights. 
 
290 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
291 For an unusually thoughtful effort to distill and apply those principles, see Shapiro, supra 
note 264. 
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With the connection between substantive constitutional guarantees and 
harms to cognizable interests in mind, we can distinguish three possible bases 
for standing that subsequent Sections of this Part will discuss in turn: 
(a) financial and material burdens of a kind that would support standing 
under a variety of constitutional provisions besides the Establishment Clause; 
(b) injury incurred in the capacity of a taxpayer whose tax dollars are used to 
support religious institutions or activities; and (c) other harms suffered as a 
result of symbolic governmental support for religion. The largest payoff from 
looking simultaneously at standing and merits issues will come in the third, 
most disputed category. But clarifying and occasionally surprising 
implications will emerge in the other categories as well. 
In all cases, it will prove illuminating to compare the Supreme Court’s 
standing analyses, which are sometimes highly restrictive, with cases in which 
the Court has assumed standing under the Establishment Clause without 
comment and rendered decisions on the merits. In Arizona Christian School 
Tuition Organization v. Winn, a narrow majority of the Justices brushed aside 
previous cases that had assumed the existence of standing as lacking 
constitutional consequence.292 A more fruitful approach would look back at 
cases decided on the merits with the aim of inferring the Court’s implicit prior 
standards for recognizing standing. If we can identify the implicit theories that 
would be both necessary and sufficient to support standing, we can then ask 
whether those theories stand up to critical scrutiny. If so, we should hold the 
Court to the bases for standing that it has implicitly embraced in the past. 
A. Financial and Material Burdens Adequate for Standing Outside the 
Establishment Clause 
Most cases involving governmentally mandated religious accommodations 
present no distinctive standing issues. When a defendant refuses to afford an 
accommodation and the plaintiff is a person denied a claimed entitlement, the 
injury is plain.293 By any account, denial of an exemption imposes costs. 
When a plaintiff brings suit to enforce a statutory mandate, the defendant 
will also have unquestionable standing to challenge the mandate as 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.294 Or, without waiting to 
be sued, an institution that is subject to a statutory duty to accommodate will 
 
292 563 U.S. 125, 144-45 (2011) (“When a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed 
in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed.”). 
293 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (emphasizing that a facial challenge 
was raised by prisoners who claimed they were denied religious accommodations). 
294 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 167-68 & n.7. 
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face a threat of financial or other loss if forced to comply and will thus have 
standing to bring an anticipatory challenge.295 
In yet another set of unproblematic cases, mandates to provide 
accommodations to some religious believers or religious conduct may impose 
corresponding burdens on those who receive no exemptions. For example, if 
Congress enacted draft exemptions for religious believers, then non-exempted 
individuals should be able to sue if their likelihood of being drafted increased 
as a result. Indeed, because draft exemptions would require religiously-based 
classifications, those who are assigned to a disadvantaged category as a result of 
their religious views could claim an analogy to white plaintiffs in affirmative 
action cases. In that context, “[t]he ‘injury in fact’ . . . is the denial of equal 
treatment resulting from the imposition of [a] barrier, not the ultimate inability 
to obtain the benefit.”296 Analogously, draft-eligible citizens might complain of 
the imposition of a religion-based barrier to their escaping conscription. 
A fraught set of standing issues has arisen when statutes mandating 
religious accommodations for religiously motivated individuals result in 
harms to third parties who are not themselves classified on the basis of 
religion—for example, women who lose access to health benefits under the 
ACA as a result of exemptions from ACA mandates for religiously motivated 
employers. Some have argued that parties disadvantaged in this way have no 
standing to complain of “burdens” because they have no “right” to health care 
or contraceptive coverage except on such terms as the government may 
choose.297 This argument fails. When women receive no contraceptive 
coverage as a result of religious exemptions, the structure of their complaints 
precisely tracks the legal analysis in Amos. In Amos, the plaintiff was allowed 
to argue that a statutory exemption from an antidiscrimination mandate 
violated the Establishment Clause due to the burden that it imposed on 
third-party interests.298 Although the plaintiff lost on the merits, no member 
of the Supreme Court doubted his entitlement to mount an Establishment 
Clause challenge when Congress stripped him of a statutory right that he 
 
295 The availability of antisuit injunctions to assert and protect constitutional rights is often 
associated with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For discussion 
of Young and relevant surrounding history, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 927-35. 
296 Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 666 (1993). 
297 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, When Religious Exemptions Cause Third-Party Harms: Is the 
Establishment Clause Violated?, 58 J. CHURCH & STATE 1, 15 (2016) (“If we are to assume a world 
where the default position is comprehensive healthcare coverage, then it is a mere tautology that 
departure from that baseline because of a RFRA accommodation for Hobby Lobby Stores and 
Conestoga Wood Specialties is a loss or ‘burden’ for their employees . . . .”). 
298  Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,  
483 U.S. 327, 333 (1987) (arguing the exemption “burdens the free exercise rights of employees of 
religious institutions who work in nonreligious jobs”). 
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otherwise would have had. Women who lose valuable health benefits as a 
result of RFRA-mandated exceptions to rights under the ACA should be able 
to sue on the same basis, even if they should not always win. 
B. Taxpayer Standing 
Taxpayer standing presents distinctive issues. In an influential dissenting 
opinion in Flast, Justice Harlan mocked the majority’s double-nexus test as 
“entirely unrelated” to the purportedly controlling issue of whether the 
plaintiff had a sufficient personal stake to justify standing.299 But taxpayer 
challengers to expenditures to support religious institutions have no less a 
personal stake than individual voters in one-person, one-vote cases or the 
males in Heckler v. Mathews who could realize no financial gain from a ruling 
in their favor.300 Moreover, taxpayer standing to enforce the Establishment 
Clause, which has existed since Flast, possesses an inherent doctrinal logic 
that taxpayer standing to enforce limits on Congress’s Spending Power under 
Article I301—or even the Free Speech or the Equal Protection Clause—would 
not: the Establishment Clause was distinctively intended to protect against 
taxation in support of religion. 
Imagine a case involving governmental financial support exclusively for 
religious education. Or imagine that Congress levied a specific tax for support 
of a newly designated National Church. Would the conservative Justices who 
have expressed skepticism of taxpayer standing say that no one had standing 
to challenge the appropriation? If they would allow other churches or 
institutions to sue, perhaps the denial of taxpayer standing would occasion no 
grave harm. It is far from clear, however, what harm a competitor church 
would suffer302—unless stigmatic harm that one would expect the 
conservatives to view with independent skepticism. In any event, if we think 
about fitting plaintiffs in light of the purposes of the Establishment Clause, 
the most appropriate would be the taxpayers whose money was extracted to 
support an Establishment of Religion.303 Mitchell and Zelman implicitly 
 
299 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 122 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
300 See supra notes 182–88 and accompanying text. 
301 See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479-80 (1923) (holding a taxpayer suit challenging 
congressional spending as unconstitutional under Article I and the Tenth Amendment to be 
nonjusticiable). 
302 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 145 (“The traditional rule was that the 
proprietor of a business lacks standing to object to the government’s support of competing activities, 
because the common law does not recognize an interest in freedom from competition.”). 
303 Cf. Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1197 (2014) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s standing cases are best understood as upholding standing by “those claimants with 
the greatest stake in obtaining legal relief in any particular case” and as denying standing to those 
with lesser stakes). But see Garnett, supra note 36, at 664 (arguing that “[t]he claim that the no-
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recognize as much. Against the background of the Court’s having rendered 
merits rulings in those cases, it would be deeply incongruous not to have 
taxpayer standing in cases involving public financial support for religious 
activities and institutions. 
If this analysis holds water, then the Court’s taxpayer standing decisions 
in Valley Forge, Hein, and Winn warrant reappraisal in light of the substantive 
merits of the claims that the challengers presented. When thus 
reconsidered, the result in Hein—sculpting executive action out of the Flast 
rule—emerges as indefensible. Flast might appear on the surface to be 
distinguishable because Hein involved executive, not congressional, 
action,304 and because the language of the Establishment Clause refers only 
to Congress, not the President.305 But if we take a wide-angle look at the 
parallel areas of Free Exercise and Free Speech Clause jurisprudence, we 
see that the Court has treated all three branches of government as capable 
of violating the First Amendment.306 The premises of its decisions imply 
that executive provision of financial and related benefits to religious 
institutions could also violate the Establishment Clause. 
The Court’s reasoning in Valley Forge looks similarly misguided. If the 
federal government cannot tax and spend directly to support religion 
without violating the Establishment Clause, then it ought not be able to 
tax, use the tax proceeds to acquire property, and then transfer the acquired 
property to religious institutions. The protective purposes of the 
Establishment Clause should extend as much to the latter case as to the 
former. As I have argued, moreover, the same protective purposes that 
would forbid a transfer of property as a matter of substantive constitutional 
law should ground a claim of taxpayer standing. 
 
establishment rule protects the liberty of conscience by regulating the disbursement of public funds 
is . . . mistaken” and that standing rules predicated on this claim are therefore also unpersuasive). 
304 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 605 (2007) (“[T]he expenditures 
at issue here were not made pursuant to any Act of Congress. Rather, Congress provided general 
appropriations to the Executive Branch to fund its day-to-day activities.”). 
305 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion”). 
306 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42, 451 (1988) 
(subjecting the conduct of the U.S. Forest Service to scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-09 (1963) (reviewing the denial of unemployment 
compensation by a state employment security commission for consistency with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments); see also Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971) 
(invalidating a prior restraint issued by an Illinois state court); Carroll v. President & Comm’rs, 
393 U.S. 175, 185 (1968) (invalidating a prior restraint ordered by a state court). For further 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s application of the First Amendment to branches other than 
Congress, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 
64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1243-46 (2015); David A. Strauss, Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30-34 (2015). 
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A similarly functional analysis would point to the conclusion that Winn, 
too, was wrongly decided. The Court should have decided the case on the 
merits. In a merits ruling, the Court could plausibly have held that a scheme 
of tax credits for donations to both religious and nonreligious tuition 
assistance organizations was substantially related to an important 
governmental interest in promoting educational diversity. But the wedge that 
the majority drove between constitutional rights under the Establishment 
Clause and standing to enforce those rights was regrettable. In Justice Kagan’s 
terms, the Court “offer[ed] a roadmap . . . to any government that wishes to 
insulate its financing of religious activity from legal challenge.”307 She 
elaborated: “Structure the funding as a tax expenditure . . . . No taxpayer will 
have standing to object. However blatantly the government may violate the 
Establishment Clause, taxpayers cannot gain access to the federal courts.”308 No 
sound approach to the interpretation of rights-conferring constitutional 
provisions such as the Establishment Clause would countenance this anomaly.309 
C. Injury Resulting from Symbolic Support 
As we begin to reappraise standing to challenge symbolic governmental 
support for religion, it bears noting once more that in almost none of the 
central cases decided to date—including crèche and Ten Commandments 
cases—has the Supreme Court paused over standing issues.310 Its failure to 
do so has perplexed the lower courts, which have had to guess at the basis on 
which the Justices thought they could reach the merits.311 Some of the cases 
may have involved taxpayer standing, even though the Court did not say so.312 
 
307 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 168 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
308 Id. Justice Kennedy’s Court opinion noted the abstract possibility that some tax credits 
might directly disadvantage “a particular religious group,” whose members then could sue to allege 
constitutional violation, id. at 145 (majority opinion). But he appeared also to contemplate that no 
one might have standing in the aftermath of Winn to challenge some schemes that at least one earlier 
Court opinion, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), 
would mark as unconstitutional. See id. at 144. 
309 Although there may frequently not be a constitutional right to pre-enforcement injunctive 
remedies when other remedies are available to the victim of a constitutional rights violation, the 
non-availability of any remedy whatsoever would be distinctively anomalous and problematic in any 
case not presenting an otherwise non-justiciable political question. On the importance of the 
distinction between non-availability of particular remedies and the denial of any remedy for a 
constitutional violation whatsoever, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 328-35. 
310 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
311 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 42. 
312 See id. at 1081 (observing that of the Supreme Court’s “four religious display cases from the 
past three decades,” in all but Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), “the lower court opinions 
either expressly found municipal taxpayer standing or did not address standing but plausibly can be 
read as predicating standing on the plaintiffs’ municipal taxpayer status”). 
2017] Tiers for the Establishment Clause 125 
But it seems unlikely that they all did. If not, we confront the puzzle of how 
standing to challenge symbolic support for religion might be rationalized. 
In Allen v. Wright,313 which involved an alleged failure by federal officials 
to deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools, the 
Supreme Court held that an allegation of stigmatization did not suffice for 
standing. With specific reference to the Establishment Clause, the Court said 
in Valley Forge that “the psychological consequence presumably produced by 
observation of conduct with which one disagrees . . . is not an injury sufficient 
to confer standing under Art. III, even though the disagreement is phrased 
in constitutional terms.”314 In gauging standing to enforce the Establishment 
Clause, however, we need to think once more about what the Clause protects 
against. For this purpose, the example of sustained one-sect proselytization 
that the conservative Justices said in County of Allegheny would violate the 
Establishment Clause—epitomized by a large Latin cross affixed to city 
hall—will serve amply.315 What harm would it visit upon whom? 
As Part III’s merits analysis may have intimated, the best answer emerges 
from the objective observer test that Justice O’Connor introduced as a 
substantive measure of constitutional impermissibility in Lynch v. Donnelly. 
Under that test, the court asks whether an objective observer would 
understand a religious symbol as “send[ing] a message to nonadherents [of a 
favored creed] that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community,”316 and as “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to 
a person’s standing in the political community.”317 Adapting that test, I would 
find standing to object to symbolic support when a reasonable observer would 
conclude that a governmental action or display sends a message that marks 
nonadherents to the favored religion as less than fully valued members of the 
community that they inhabit.318 In order to claim standing on this basis, a 
plaintiff should need to allege that she is a member of the stigmatized or 
marginalized group and that her ordinary course of life—not action taken 
 
313 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984). 
314 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982). 
315 See County. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
316 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
317 Id. at 687-88. 
318 See Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution, 85 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 407, 439-40 (2011) (“When . . . the Supreme Court began to regard governmental 
endorsement of religion as a violation of the Establishment Clause . . . it came to be supposed 
that the offense suffered by observers was sufficient to confer standing.”); see also Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 36, at 135 & n.99 (equating a standing injury of “religious alienation” with 
“Justice O’Connor’s ‘no endorsement’ theory”). 
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solely to create standing to bring a lawsuit—brings her or will bring her into 
contact with the challenged activity or display.319 
As Part III emphasized, the objective observer test admittedly requires 
judgment in administration. As a test for standing, however, the objective 
observer formula is not significantly more open-textured than other 
standing tests that depend on the identification of noneconomic injury. In 
the case of symbolic speech of the kind involved in displays of crèches and 
the Ten Commandments, there is a powerful, broadly shared constitutional 
intuition that some challengers come sufficiently within the zone of 
interests that the Establishment Clause protects to deserve a ruling on the 
merits of their claims, presumably because they suffer a harm of some kind. 
All of the Justices appear to have credited this intuition in reaching the 
merits in the Court’s leading cases. 
Alternative efforts to explain standing in cases involving crèches or Ten 
Commandments displays—or, one should bear in mind, in a case involving 
the erection of a large Latin cross atop a city hall—are all less convincing. 
We should agree that mere feelings of offense do not furnish a plausible 
basis for standing. Some more objective measure seems necessary.320 Mere 
unwanted exposure to religious images or expression should not suffice 
unless a further, more objective test is satisfied.321 Sometimes the harm 
issuing from unwanted exposure to symbolic support for religion should not 
rise to the level of judicial cognizability—as in the case of “In God We 
Trust” on the currency. Nor does it make sense to uphold standing based 
on the costs that particular challengers may incur in order to avoid exposure 
to displays that they do not want to see.322 This approach would allow 
anyone to manufacture standing through the expedient of making a few 
even slightly costly detours (or by making all purchases with checks or 
credit cards in order not to encounter “In God We Trust”). 
 
319 Under this standard, many if not most residents of Allegheny County would have had 
standing to challenge the crèche and menorah displays in County. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 578. 
Similarly, a lawyer who regularly used the law library in the Texas State Capitol would have had 
standing to challenge the Ten Commandments display in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 
(2005). But a Massachusetts resident who happened to hear of the exhibits would not have standing 
absent further facts that I have not stipulated. The question of exactly who would have standing to 
challenge the erection of a memorial cross at a national monument might be a more difficult one, 
but a regular visitor ought to qualify. Cf. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 711 (2010) (upholding the 
standing of a former National Park Service employee to object to a display on federal land but 
dividing about the grounds for standing). 
320 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 42, at 1083 (critically discussing this asserted basis for standing). 
321 See id. at 1090-91 (“[I]nvoluntary exposure requirements do nothing to redeem a naked 
‘direct personal contact’ test from its absolute incompatibility with the Supreme Court’s standing 
precedents because they do not alter the nature of the alleged harm.”). 
322 See id. at 1091-92 (noting the limits of such an approach). 
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A final alternative would be to hold that no one has standing in symbolic 
speech cases in the absence of either coercion or taxpayer standing.323 But this 
approach should satisfy no one. It would put some actual or imaginable cases 
of what nearly everyone—liberal and conservative alike—would regard as 
plain violations of a rights-conferring provision of the Constitution beyond 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts to rectify. 
The same analysis largely holds in cases involving religion in the public 
schools. If the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from using its 
role in furnishing public education to endorse religious dogma, and creates 
rights against endorsement, then the harms occasioned by coerced exposure 
to unwanted proselytization should suffice to support standing. 
CONCLUSION 
When compared with other constitutional doctrines, Establishment 
Clause doctrine is an outlier with respect both to the merits and to standing. 
Although the Supreme Court should maintain the outlines of the largely 
category-based approach that currently prevails in Establishment Clause 
litigation, the Justices could, and should, clarify a number of issues and 
resolve some persistent confusions by pulling Establishment Clause doctrine 
more nearly into the constitutional mainstream. In particular, the Court 
should adopt a regime of sequenced, tiered merits analysis and, regardless of 
category, should apply elevated scrutiny to statutes that impinge on interests 
that the Establishment Clause protects. Within such a regime, the Court 
should apply strict scrutiny to any statute that classifies or requires 
classifications based on religion. It should prescribe intermediate scrutiny for 
statutes that expend tax revenues to provide material benefits to churches or 
religiously affiliated organizations on a nondiscriminatory, nonpreferential 
basis. And it should clarify its approach to determining which symbolic 
supports for religion rise to the level of Establishment Clause violations, even 
when honesty requires acknowledging that promoting religion is their 
predominant purpose. Correspondingly, the Court should realign standing 
doctrine to equate the injuries needed for standing more closely with those 
against which the Establishment Clause furnishes substantive protection. 
 
323 For a defense of this approach, rooted both in concerns about the separation of powers and 
in prudential interests in avoiding judicial involvement in “the culture wars,” see id. at 1092-97. Both 
lines of argument rely on without expressly defending the premise—which I have argued is 
mistaken—that the Establishment Clause confers few if any individual rights in cases not involving 
coercion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * * * 
